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Abstract 
Power is an essential element of human existence and manifestation of power can be found 
in every dimension of human social life from interpersonal relations to international political 
disputes.  Russian national resource power, in particular, has recently become a more 
prominent topic of research among scholars of Russian foreign policy study and 
international politics. There are two major trends in foreign policy literature that stand out – 
a study of Russian hard coercive power capacity and a preoccupation with the use of 
‘ussiaŶ soft poǁeƌ. If the foƌŵeƌ is a stƌaight foƌǁaƌd studǇ of ‘ussia͛s ŵilitaƌǇ poǁeƌ aŶd 
territorial dominance, the latter embraces the original soft power concept of Joseph Nye 
(1990; 2004a; 2004b; 2008; 2010; 2011) to assess Russia͛s poǁeƌ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe Đapaďilities. 
Thus, the extensive EU gas market specifically is an object of geopolitical race for regional 
influence and political dominance, particularly with Russia as the main driver. As the 
likelihood increased that Russia would dominate European gas supply, the question 
eŵeƌged as to hoǁ ‘ussia ǁould use its gas diploŵaĐǇ to iŶflueŶĐe EU ŵeŵďeƌ states͛ 
policies and extract political concessions.  
The thesis aims to move away from the traditional approach of segregating power models 
and the task to objectively measure it by the characteristics of power tools in use. Instead it 
acknowledges the improbability to effectively measure the intensity of power types used by 
‘ussia aŶd eŵďƌaĐes Joseph NǇe͛s ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of ŵiǆed poǁeƌ – smart power. In 
examining Russian smart power it adopts comparative methodology to understand whether 
Russian energy diplomacy has characteristics of smart power foreign policy in the EU. 
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Introduction  
Power is an essential element of human existence and manifestation of power can be found in every 
day dimension of human social life from interpersonal relations to international political disputes.  
Russian power, in particular, has recently become a topic of research among scholars of Russian 
foreign policy study and international politics. Alas, the concept is commonly used and applied in 
social sciences, it is very difficult to measure and the analysis of Russian power has remained limited 
in scope and practical conceptualisation. 
There are two major trends in foreign policy literature that stand out – a study of Russian hard 
coercive power capacity and a preoccupation with the use of Russian soft power (Aslund, 2006; 
Avgerinos, 2009; Bilgin, 2011; Feklyuena, 2012). If the foƌŵeƌ is a stƌaight foƌǁaƌd studǇ of ‘ussia͛s 
military power and territorial dominance, the latter embraces the original soft power concept of 
Joseph NǇe to assess ‘ussia͛s poǁeƌ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe Đapaďilities. “uĐh assessŵeŶt has ofteŶ ƌesulted iŶ 
conclusion that Russia is ultimately failing to produce soft power. The conclusion is similar if Russian 
soft power effectiveness is analysed beyond the criteria set by Nye. Neither of these, however, seem 
to produce sufficient conceptual or practical measurement of power and its effective use. Hence, the 
issue of Russian policy subject lacks micro-conceptualisation and the importance of the recipient of 
Russian power is overlooked.  
The thesis aims to move away from the traditional approach of segregating power models into hard 
power and soft power, instead the task is to objectively measure smart power strategies in use by 
assessing appearances of Russian power tools deployed. It acknowledges the challenges to 
effectively measure the intensity of power types used by Russia and therefore embraces Joseph 
NǇe͛s ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of ŵiǆed poǁeƌ – smart power. In examining Russian smart power it adopts 
comparative methodology to understand whether Russian energy diplomacy has characteristics of 
smart power foreign policy in the EU. By drawing attention on to the energy diplomacy and applying 
NǇe͛s ϱ poiŶt Đƌiteƌia to ideŶtifǇ sŵaƌt poǁeƌ tools.  
PutiŶ͛s ‘ussia has ofteŶ ďeeŶ assoĐiated ǁith the ƌise of ‘ussia͛s iŵpoƌtaŶĐe as a EuƌopeaŶ eŶeƌgǇ 
supplier (Bousenna & Locatelli, 2013, Locatelli, 2014). Thus, the extensive EU gas market specifically 
is an object of the geopolitical race for regional influence and political dominance, particularly with 
Russia as the main driver. As the likelihood increased that Russia would dominate European gas 
supply, the question emerged as to how Russia would use its gas diplomacy to influence EU member 
states͛ policies and extract political concessions. Big projects define the understanding of Russian 
foreign energy policy. In the case of the gas conflicts with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 Russia had 
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demonstrated an acute desire for profit, employing a set of opportunistic actions that lacked a 
coherent geostrategic vision. As a response to this claim (Bousenna & Locatelli, 2013), the Nord 
Stream project in 2011 and the South Stream project in 2012 were implemented and launched 
ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ shoǁiŶg the KƌeŵliŶ͛s desiƌe to sustaiŶ ͚the ƌeliaďle supplieƌ͛ iŵage. CoŶĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ, the 
annexation of Crimean peninsula in 2014 shows Russian disinterest to follow the international norms 
and a willingness to use established gas relations with the EU as a political leverage.   
Related to this is the impact Russia has on European energy security (see works by Aalto, 2008; 
Soderbergh et al, 2010; Boussena & Locatelli, 2013). In Europe, it is often portrayed as an unreliable 
supplier, dedicated to use the gas as leverage against its customers, implementing transit 
infrastructure projects to avoid transit states, and maintaining a monopoly on existing routes to 
Europe (see works by Monaghan, 2007; Saunders, 2008; Pohler, 2009; Smith Stegen, 2011; Crandall, 
2014; Kropatcheva, 2014). A minority of the literature on Russian energy policy, however, portrays a 
more pragmatic Russia by focusing on the rationality of its actions (see works by Bozhilova & 
Hashimoto, 2010; Orttung & Overland, 2011).The vast majority of literature on foreign energy policy, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌeaĐhes ĐoŶseŶsus aŶd foĐuses oŶ ‘ussia as a poteŶtial ͚eŶeƌgǇ supeƌpoǁeƌ͛ aŶd the 
impact that the energy surplus has on its foreign policy (see works by Baev, 2008; Rutland, 2008; 
Shaffer, 2009; Van Der Meulen, 2009; Dellecker & Gomart, 2011). The high natural energy prices of 
the fiƌst deĐade of the tǁeŶtǇ fiƌst ĐeŶtuƌǇ haǀe tuƌŶed ‘ussia͛s eŶeƌgǇ ƌesouƌĐe ǁealth iŶto 
economic wealth and converted it into political confidence on the international stage. It is, as 
President Putin (2006) has noted, a key element of Russian diplomacy.  
Since gas diplomacy is the main driver of Russian foreign energy policy, the nature of diplomatic 
tools shapes the patterns of its international behaviour. Over the years many scholars tried to 
provide formulas to quantify power in international relations, however the concept of power is 
surpassingly elusive and difficult to measure (see works by March, 1966; Tellis et al, 2000; Baldwin, 
2002; Keltner et al, 2003). Any academic attempt to develop a single index of power is challenging 
because power depends upon human relationships that very in different relationships contexts (Nye, 
2011, p.14). During the current cycle of the gas market the EU has experienced an influx of demand 
from domestic consumers that cannot be satisfied by the volume of domestic gas supply (see works 
by Spanjer, 2007; Van Der Meulen, 2009; Umbach, 2010; Boussena & Locatelli, 2013; Smith, 2013). 
This sustained rise in demand also impacts the shifts in the power structure between agent and 
customer countries.  
When the power of resources is concerned, in a perfect market, the agent would not have any 
power over resource pricing or distribution. The system of supply and demand would determine 
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these outcomes. But if the producer can find a way to change the structure of the market by 
introducing a monopoly, it can ultimately gain power over its clients. For example, although Brussels 
holds a far greater power than the Kremlin in conventional terms of population count, life 
expectancy, economic development and combined military budget, Russia has successfully 
fragmented European unity. In the complexity of changed systems arrangements, the agent can find 
and exploit structural holes to prevent direct communication between individual parts of the 
network. The EU-Russian energy forum is therefore composed of a series of interrelated, yet diverse 
bilateral relations. France, for example, views Russia as one possible provider for its domestic market 
consumption needs among other alternatives such as Norway and Algeria. Germany, although not 
exclusively, is considerably dependent on Russian natural gas imports. Thus, Russia participates in 
energy negotiations with both France and Germany forming a rational economic and political stance. 
By comparison, many of the Eastern European member states tend to be anti-Soviet or Russophobe 
as a result of their recent historical memory. Yet, due to their strong vested desire to keep an 
uninterrupted delivery of Russian gas to their respective markets, the region ops out of disallowing  
their emotional political exuberance to undermine economic rational (De Brito et al, 2001; Bozhilova 
&Hashimoto; 2010). 
Contrary to the prevalent perception that the EU can only be divided in terms of political integration 
when examining Russian international power, the division between the member states is more 
complex than a split between ͚Old EuƌopeaŶ͛ developed countries and Eastern and South-Eastern 
͚New Europe͛  (see policy paper for European Council of Foreign Relations by Leonard & Popescu, 
2007). To identify the type of power Russian gas diplomacy is employing and how it advances foreign 
policy goals, one must ask how Russia divides the European gas market to employ gas diplomacy 
most effectively. To answer this question the researcher analyses the dynamic of Russian interaction 
with member states through by separating the EU into regions of foreign policy interest.  
The researcher chose to conduct the power study in the EU member states due to the unique 
structure of the supranational organisation. The EU energy policy falls under the merit of the Treaty 
of Lisbon legal solidarity and has been approved a mandatory trans-union legislation in 2005 (Braun, 
2012). The EU states that the researcher uses as the case studies have been divided by using socio-
economic rather than geographical criteria. The four distinct areas are crystallised with which Russia 
engages by employing different power tactics and these areas are shared by old and new member 
states alike: 1) Eastern Europe and the Baltic states– Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland are 
completely or almost completely dependent on Russian gas imports and Russian gas infrastructure. 
Simultaneously, these member states tend to have an overtly hostile relationship with the Kremlin 
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and the deteriorating political relations often spill over into energy security and commerce. 2) 
Central and Southern Europe – Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Cypress, and Malta. This is the biggest region of Russian 
interest. It is comprised of middle power states that maintain a close relationship with Russia due to 
established commercial, cultural or historical ties. However, the underpinning characteristic of the 
region is their willingness to focus on business interests beyond common EU political goals. 3) 
Northern European region is made up from Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. Russian gas relations with these states are different from rest of the EU due to the 
region being almost completely independent from Russian gas. At the same time, the Northern 
European proximity to the Arctic is a main driver in relations between Russia, Denmark and Sweden. 
4) The last case study examines Russian gas power in Western Europe comprised of Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. These countries occupy prominent positions in the EU due to being 
the driving economies of the Union. Thus, aside from Spain and Portugal they all have strongly 
established bilateral relations with Russia.  
The purpose addressed is to establish what type of power Russian gas diplomacy uses to engage 
with the EU regions. A geopolitical approach to Russian gas diplomacy in the EU will therefore rest 
on the following keystones: 1) Identification of the power vector of gas diplomacy and its main 
elements in EU case study regions and 2) identification of the overall nature of Russian gas 
diplomacy within Russian foreign energy policy. A nominal scale is used to identify variables of 
Russian gas diplomacy – hard power and soft power. According to Sartori (1970, p.59) the nominal 
scale is a type of labelling variables that have no quantitative properties. The major premise is that 
identifying the extent to which Russian gas diplomacy is a smart power strategy is impossible prior to 
identifying the power variables defining it. Therefore, the investigation concerns itself with two 
questions of power theory coined by J. Nye (2011, p.208) – firstly, what goals and outcomes are 
preferred by the Russian gas diplomacy in the region and secondly, what resources are available to 
Russian gas diplomacy. 
This thesis is organised in a following way. The next section will present a methodological framework 
for the study. In this empirical section, the researcher demonstrates the plausibility of the claim that 
Russian gas diplomacy is a smart power tool in the context of the four EU regional case studies – 
Eastern European and the Baltic States region, Central and Southern European region, Northern 
European region and Western European region. Further, before the thesis investigates these 
regions, it gives a literature review on international power types, drawing onto academic works of 
Professor Joseph Nye who has devised three separate types of international power – hard power, 
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soft power and smart power. It then presents a critical account of power in mainstream studies 
informed by classical international relations theories. Additionally, as the second theoretical 
objective it explores the domestic and external context of Russian gas diplomacy and poses the 
questions whether the national energy policy and the competiveness of the global gas market affect 
the choice of power type used in the gas diplomacy. The analytical section is then comprised of the 
aforementioned case studies to investigate Russian gas diplomacy by linking it with power types. The 
thesis is concluded with overall trends, analysis and implications of Russian gas diplomacy in the EU 
as a whole. The dissertation argues that the Russo- European gas dialogue and currently undertaken 
Russian gas infrastructure projects within the EU borders can be credibly identified as manifestations 
of Russian smart power gas diplomacy. These power mechanisms in turn are direct projection of 
Russian foreign energy policies. Whether this analysis amounts to more than a necessary corrective 
to existing and increasingly scholastic aspects of contemporary international power relation thinking 
is unclear, but at the very least the findings collected here contribute to an important and timely 
debate how we should approach the study of power. 
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Methodology 
To test the hypothesis a comparative research method is used. The term comparative is 
commonly applied to the research methodology designed to collect data emphasising the 
key similarities and differences between the chosen cases (Finifter, ed, 1993, p.105) by using 
the concepts that are applicable to more than one case study (Rose & McKenzie, 1991). 
Thus, the method possesses a methodological focus that emphasises how the analysis is 
conducted (Lijphart, 1971). This methodology sharpens the power of the description 
analysis and plays a central role in concept formation. The comparative method also favours 
the macro-hypothesis of the study of power as it concerns the interrelations of structural 
elements of total systems (Rokkan, 1970).  
When using the comparative method, before one can investigate the presence or absence 
of some attribute, or before one can rank or measure objects in term of some variable 
(Lijphart, 1971), one has to form the concept of that variable (Barton & Lazarsfeld 1955). 
The analysis is therefore designed to investigate the relationships between Russia and the 
individual EU regions, while the legislative and normative frameworks of gas relations are 
held constant. The EU was chosen as a test study because it can be divided into smaller 
entities that are groups of the EU member states dissimilar in relation to each other. They 
all however possess an essential characteristic, that of being members of a supranational 
organisation which is treated as a constant. The case study regions used, for example, are 
recipients of Russian gas and all have similar legislative energy security framework 
reinforced by the Common European Energy Policy. Such comparable cases are a 
particularly good opportunity for applying comparative method as they allow testing the 
relationships among few variables while the rest are controlled (Lijphart, 1971; Mahoney, 
2007). Thus the methodology used in the study addresses two purposes.  
Firstly, to achieve the maximum result when comparing a vast amount of the EU member 
countries among themselves, four EU regions are determined, the coding of which is done 
using the scale of socio-political, socio-economic and cultural trends. These are Eastern 
Europe (EE) and the Baltic States, Central and Southern European (CSE) region, Western 
European (WE) region and Northern European (NE) region. The four case studies are not 
divided by the geographical criteria but rather by the degree of influence Russian gas 
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diplomacy has on the particular region. This involves an in-depth study of regional energy 
markets, beginning by looking to their origins and history, and moving on to examine the 
policy making process in action, in an attempt to gain insight into the roles played by Russia, 
the EU and regional powers, the relative amount of influence each holds, and the power 
relationships among them. The selected typology allows the seeking out of more complete 
stories based on a wider range of documentation and a reinterpretation of previous 
aĐadeŵiĐ studies. ͚The leŶgtheŶiŶg speĐtƌuŵ of politiĐal sǇsteŵs͛ ;BƌaiďaŶti, ϭϵϲϵ, pp.33-
34) is a source of conceptual and methodological challenge for any comparative study. 
While there is an end and definition to the geographical size, there is no end to the 
proliferation of political units (Sartori, 1970). To avoid this challenge the coding of the case 
studies is done to reduce the property-space (Lijphart, 1971) of the analysis by combining 
several test cases that express similar underlying social, cultural, political, and economic 
characteristics into a single test group. The advantage is that the universe of discourse is 
liŵited oŶ the ďasis of the ͚ŵost siŵilaƌ sǇsteŵs desigŶ͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe that ďoth the iŶteƌŶal 
and external validity is considered to be enhanced (Almond and Verba, 1963; Llane and 
Ersson, 1999). 
The data ĐolleĐtioŶ iŶ the Đase studǇ oĐĐuƌs oǀeƌ a ͚sustaiŶed peƌiod of tiŵe͛ aŶd 
investigates the phenomenon in a real-life context (Creswell, 2009). Thus, the data used by 
the researcher is collected through document interpretation to give the voice and meaning 
around the trends of power politics. The three primary types of the documents used are 
public records made available by Russian government and the EU parliament, and physical 
evidence such maps, pipeline plans and project blueprints and environmental reports. The 
data analysis consisted of examining the documents for reliable, appropriate information 
that is addressing the research question. No major difficulties with source survival or 
availability were encountered; the relevant documentary sources were in the public domain 
and are readily available, primarily from European Commission website. However, the main 
difficulty in analysing such a vast amount of resources available lay in sifting, sourcing and 
identifying the most relevant ones to the study conducted. Another avenue of investigation 
involved study of the public commentary, which is expected to have significant impact on 
policy development in the EU liberal democratic model of governance. The researcher 
examined public comments, the vast majority of which are either archived by the various 
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media outlets or the EU Petition Committee.  It was identified that some common themes 
and proposals by region exist, particularly those that have broad support or extensive 
opposition across a significant proportion of commentators. These will be then compared to 
the output of the policy formation in an effort to determine whether input from public 
commentators tends to get incorporated into actual policy recommendations and therefore 
the researcher will be able to measure the extent of the soft power influence on the policy 
decision making.  
Participant narratives and academic journal articles are used to interpret the themes of 
Russian gas diplomacy in regards to the individual case study regions being evaluated. The 
coding for this scale was carried out by analysing data collected from primary source 
documents such as minutes of the EU debates and committee meetings, EU Commission 
reports, and finalised policy statements. When coding the minutes of the EU debates and 
official reports, the individual statements in this data could be identified with the individual 
speakers, the data was not analysed at the individual level. The unit of analysis was data 
segments representing and reflecting the official position of the states. In addition to the 
souƌĐes listed, ‘ussiaŶ peƌiodiĐals aŶd ‘ussiaŶ politiĐiaŶs͛ speeĐh tƌaŶsĐƌipts peƌtaiŶiŶg to 
Russian energy politics will be utilised where required. These were translated by the 
researcher from Russian to English and were kept contextually as close to the original as the 
translation permitted. 
Reliability and validity are important aspects of the document interpretation. Despite the 
vast amount of official documentary evidence available to conduct an investigation into the 
official Russian actions, there certain gaps in the official records supporting Kremlin decision 
making, for example there are few minutes of meetings with Gazprom executives available. 
Moreover, due to the character of the relationship between the Kremlin and Gazprom there 
are certain potential limitations with such document sources as there is no guarantee that 
official meeting statements will capture everything that was discussed and could be written 
to present Gazprom activities in a more positive light to the public. In an attempt to 
overcome such limitations as well as endeavour to fill gaps in documentary records evidence 
from policy discourse, such as public pronouncements, policy debates are used. These also 
include non-governmental archival materials and ethnographical techniques (outlined 
below) that will support pragmatism methods of research of elite-oriented study and will 
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eventually reach conclusions about the nature of power and policy making processes based 
on the evidence collected. Relevant primary sources include policy archives of governments, 
online archives of inter-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and 
supranational organisations, as well as press reports, and interviews supplemented and 
contextualised through secondary sources. Treaties, conventions, negotiations, and 
procedure papers also manifest materials that were used to contextualise by the researcher.  
This findings of the thesis therefore are primarily based on an analysis of current primary 
source documents on the topic of Russian gas diplomacy as it is developed as a strategy of 
foreign policy in various EU regions and on the consequent debate of power as it is 
constituted in international relations. Prior knowledge of the dependent variable of smart 
power is limited when the case studies are concerned. The research, therefore, will heavily 
rely on contributions of state elites and governments and of scholars from political science 
and IR. In particular, for the concept of smart power the author will refer to the works of 
Joseph Nye. The case study furthermore is a test of the proposition that smart power 
relations exist within Russia/EU framework. Each case study then will take the form of step-
by -step investigation into each of the Russian gas projects, examining the work of the 
various European policy committees and attempting to evaluate the relative influence of 
Russian interests in producing the specific policy outcomes resulting from their work.  
14 
 
Literature review  
Power is an absolute social force, it is a characteristic of every social interaction and the 
manifestations of power can be appreciated on every stage of human evolution. In its most 
basic form, power is the ability to get outcomes one desires. As the human race evolved and 
our social systems became increasingly more complicated, so did the manifestations of 
power. Therefore, if power is analysed in term of international politics, a simplified 
definition can be applied to a broad-spectrum political power – ͚the aďilitǇ to iŶflueŶce the 
ďehaǀiouƌ of otheƌs to aĐhieǀe desiƌaďle outĐoŵes͛ ;NǇe, ϮϬϬϰa, p.ϮͿ. Yet siŵilaƌlǇ to aŶǇ 
generalised idea power is a contested concept. Consequently, no definition of power is 
widely accepted among academics and the way one perceives power reflects oŶe͛s ďeliefs 
and values.  
Traditionally political power tends to be associated with political realism (Wendt, 1987; 
Katzenstein et al, 1998; Wendt, 1999). Historically, realist concept of power is based on the 
assumption that dominant military capabilities and economic resources can be paralleled 
with the ability of a state to establish its supremacy over other states (Wagner, 2005). A 
realist approach, therefore, emphasises the hard power capabilities of states. Realists 
accept the conceptualisation that political international environment is anarchical in nature 
and the use of coercive hard power by the international actors is the only way to express 
power (Jervis, 1998; Wilson III, 2008; Klinke, 2012). Realists argue that power is the decisive 
determinant of the international relations among individual states and is essential to 
understanding the dynamics of war and peace (Schmidt, 2007). Indeed, for all realists John 
Meaƌsheiŵeƌ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ǁƌote that ĐalĐulatioŶs aďout poǁeƌ aƌe ďased oŶ the states͛ 
perception of the world around them. Given this undisputed assumption, which he argues is 
supported by history (Schmidt 2007), acquisition and management of power becomes 
central feature of the relationships among states.  
When realists attempt to specify power, theǇ usuallǇ adopt ‘oďeƌt Dahl͛s ;ϭϵϲϭ; ϭϵϲϴͿ 
defiŶitioŶ of ͚A gettiŶg B to do soŵethiŶg B ǁouldŶ͛t otheƌǁise do͛. This diŵeŶsioŶ of 
poǁeƌ is also kŶoǁŶ as ͚fiƌst faĐe of poǁeƌ͛, aŶd  the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ is uŶdeƌstood as the 
production of intended effects on otheƌ states, ŵoƌe pƌeĐiselǇ as A affeĐtiŶg B͛s pƌefeƌeŶĐes 
through shaping and influencing its own values (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). Thus Robert Dahl 
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(1961) emphasised that power refers to the relationship among social units and becomes an 
empirical regulaƌitǇ ŵeasuƌiŶg the iŵpaĐt of oŶe ageŶt͛s ďehaǀiouƌ oǀeƌ the ďehaǀiouƌ of 
another agent. It assesses the results of power relationship with the means to an end 
approach. This view of power, however, poses the question of how does one identify the 
instances of ĐoeƌĐioŶ. It is oŶ this ďasis that Dahl iŶsists that the ͚fiƌst faĐe of poǁeƌ͛ oŶlǇ 
manifests in the instances of conflict (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980) and it resonates well with 
the realist assumption of states as competing entities and of power as an ability to win wars.  
Dahl͛s ŵethod of ŵeasuƌiŶg poǁeƌ is ĐƌitiĐised ŵost effeĐtiǀelǇ ďǇ Peteƌ BaĐhƌaĐh aŶd 
MoƌtoŶ Baƌatz ;ϭϵϲϯ; ϭϵϳϬͿ. TheǇ aƌgue that the ŵaŶifestatioŶ of the ͚fiƌst faĐe of poǁeƌ͛ 
does not take into account the difference in significance of the decisions made by states. 
Hence, essentially, Dahl fails to address a situation when decisions are not made at all. Thus 
BaĐhƌaĐh aŶd Baƌatz pƌopose that aŶalǇsis of ͚ŶoŶ͛ deĐisioŶs is the ͚seĐoŶd faĐe of poǁeƌ͛ 
(Berenskoetter, 2007). Their main argument is that the measurement of power must 
address the question of which states have the authority to exclude issues from the 
discussion. This facet of power is also known as the agenda-setting power and is an ability of 
states to ͚Đƌeate oƌ ƌeiŶfoƌĐe ďaƌƌieƌs to the puďliĐ aiƌiŶg of poliĐǇ ĐoŶfliĐt͛ ;BaĐhƌaĐh & 
Baratz, 1970, p.3). If one can shape the ideas and agenda in such a way that the preferences 
of the otheƌs seeŵ iƌƌeleǀaŶt, the ŶeĐessitǇ foƌ ĐoŶfliĐt disappeaƌs. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the suďjeĐt͛s 
acquiescence iŶ the legitiŵaĐǇ of the ageŶda is ǁhat ĐoŶstitutes the ͚seĐoŶd faĐe of poǁeƌ͛ 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). As a result, power is exercised by those states that have the 
aďilitǇ to ŵoďilise ͚the ƌules of the gaŵe͛ to theiƌ ďeŶefit aŶd thus liŵitiŶg the Đhoice of 
which decisions can be taken. If the co-operation in agenda setting is achieved by the means 
of threats and coercion – it is just aŶ iŶstaŶĐe of the ͚fiƌst faĐe of poǁeƌ͛. Bachrach and 
Baƌatz͛s theoƌǇ uŶlike Dahl͛s eŵphasises ŵoƌe stƌuĐtuƌal featuƌes of power. Instead of 
assuming that power relations are the interaction of two autonomous individuals, one of 
which must be inevitably identified as more powerful, it moves to argue how the 
environment of the interaction structurally disadvantages one side (Bachrach & Baratz, 
1970).  
A further theoretical discussion of hard power decision making, however, complements 
Dahl͛s theoƌǇ of poǁeƌ ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt. Haƌd poǁeƌ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ďehaǀiouƌ is associated 
ǁith a ͚Đaƌƌot aŶd stiĐk͛ appƌoaĐh ;BaƌƌǇ, ϭϵϴϵ; Art, 1996; Cooper, 2004, Wilson III, 2008, 
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Nye, 2013), a state can influence other actors to achieve its desirable outcomes by threats 
and coercion – ͚the stiĐk͛; oƌ it ĐaŶ do it ďǇ paǇŵeŶts – ͚the Đaƌƌot͛ ;BaldǁiŶ, ϮϬϬϮ; 
Copeland, 2010). The realist baseline takes the distribution of military capabilities (Waltz, 
1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) and economic resources (Morgenthau, 1960; Aron, 1966; Carr, 
2001) as the indicator for measuring power (Berenskoetter, 2007). Therefore, a hard power 
strategy defines power as synonymous with resources to project power because those who 
are best endowed with power resources should always get the desirable behavioural 
outcomes. If people can notice and measure resources; resource power becomes tangible 
(Dahl, 1961; Baldwin, 2002). 
Understanding power as control over resources leads to the questions; to what extent 
different types of resources can be combined into a single indicator of power and to what 
extent resources can be used effectively across all dimensions of policy making. Regardless 
of A͛s iŶteŶtioŶ, B Ŷeeds to kŶoǁ of A͛s ƌesouƌĐes aŶd also ďe aǁaƌe of ǁheŶ aŶd hoǁ these 
resources can be used (Hart, 1976). Thus, it is important to understand which resources 
provide the best basis for hard power behaviour. Furthermore, the states which possess the 
power resources need to also have a will to use them, in turn; the will becomes a power 
resource in itself (Hart, 1976). Although, this point is rejected by most realists 
(Berenskoetter 2007, p.8), defining power as synonymous to resources runs the risk of 
losing the behavioural dimension of power, specifically that the presence of resources must 
be known by others (Jervis, 1976). Joseph Nye argues that the power resources are only the 
tangible row materials that can be applied within a well maintained, favourable power 
relationship context (Nye, 2011). Simply reducing power to resource discourse constitutes 
the ͚ǀehiĐle fallaĐǇ͛ ;Moƌƌis, ϮϬϬϮͿ. “iŶĐe the outĐoŵes, Ŷot ƌesouƌĐes, aƌe ǁhat poliĐǇ-
makers are concerned with, it is imperative to acknowledge the significance of relational 
context. 
Although realist theory remains crucial to understanding the contemporary practice of 
international politics, critics continue to identify a variety of inconsistencies in many of its 
central tenants. This is especially relevant to the manner in which realists define, measure 
and utilise the concept of power. Generally, realism theory lacks a general consensus on the 
most appropriate manner to conceptualise and measure power (Baldwin, 2002; Barnett & 
Duval, 2005a, Schmidt). Most recently, Joseph Nye (2011) accused realists of failing to 
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consider the changing nature of power. Thus, the famous Thucydidean axiom that is very 
frequently used by international politics scholars - ͚the stƌoŶg do ǁhat theǇ can and the 
ǁeak suffeƌ ǁhat theǇ ŵust͛ ;JohŶsoŶ BadgǇ, ϭϵϵϰͿ – might not have much validity if one 
takes time not only to define the outcomes of power but also to explore the context of a 
power relationship. A reversal of power dynamics has occurred since the end of the Cold 
War and the new concepts of empowerment have brought the sudden realisation that the 
͚ĐaŶ do͛ of the stƌoŶg is diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ the usual ƌepeƌtoiƌe of iŶteƌŶatioŶal politiĐs aŶd as a 
ƌesult ͚ŵust suffeƌ͛ is uŶdeƌgoiŶg a tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ (Kratochwil, 1993). Joseph Nye (2008, 
p.ϮϴͿ Đalls it  ͚ĐoŶĐƌete fallaĐǇ͛ of poǁeƌ ƌelatioŶs, iŵplǇiŶg that poǁeƌ pƌojeĐtioŶ has ďeeŶ 
undergoing changes and has been adjusting to the abundance of international actors.  
Indeed, much of the contemporary sociological debate about power revolves around the 
issue of its maintenance (March, 1966; Foucault, 1980, Van Dijk, 1989, Tellis et al, 2000; 
Baldwin, 2002; Keltner et al, 2003; Kegley, 2008). The preservation of power has become a 
strategy for national governments due to the phenomena of reoccurring power transition 
and what Joseph Nye (2010) calls contemporary power diffusion. Power transition is a 
traditional power shift and has well-documented historical occurrences (Lemke & Reed, 
1996; Lemke & Tammen, 2003; Bussmann & Oneal, 2007; Chan, 2007). It takes place when 
power tools are shifting from one state to another. The classical narrative of power 
transition can be seen in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution (Mann, 2012). Power 
shift occurred from the East to the West due to the technological advance of the Western 
empires (Justman & Gradstein, 1999). A contemporary narrative of power shift can be also 
seen in the decline of the Soviet Union that gave way to the development of the sole 
American superpower and its subsequent dominance in international affairs (Lemke, 1997). 
More recently the power transition is associated with the rise of Asia (Lemke & Tammen, 
2003; Xuetong, 2006; Beeson, 2009; Nye 2011), more specifically the return of China to 
economic great power status and its ability to dominate the global market (Nye, 2010). 
Importantly, the EU energy market can also be described as undergoing a power transition. 
During this current financial cycle the EU has experienced an influx of demand from 
domestic gas consumers that cannot be satisfied by the volume of domestic gas supply 
(Spanjer, 2007; Van Der Meulen, 2009; Umbach, 2010; Boussena & Locatelli, 2013, Smith, 
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2013). This sustained rise in demand forces power to transition from the consumer to the 
supplier countries. 
Joseph Nye (2010), amongst others (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Chadwick, 2013), argues 
that power diffusion, on the contrary, is a prevailing characteristic of the current century. It 
is a shift downwards away from national governments to the non-governmental actors. The 
process is defined by the acknowledgement of power of information and the inability of 
even the most powerful states to control it (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, Nye, 2010). This 
suggests that international politics are no longer the sole province of state governments. 
Individuals, private commercial organisations, NGOs and various social movements are now 
empowered to play a direct role in world politics (Nye, 2011). The speed and the spread of 
the information mean that the new actors on the international political stage are able to 
undercut the traditional bureaucracy of national governments. Thinking in terms of 
traditional power action, the flow of information enables the non-governmental actors to 
privatise power (Nye, 2011).  
Under these circumstances of constant power shifts, hard power fails to achieve desirable 
outcomes (Schweller, 2010; Nye, 2011) and the traditional ways of thinking about power as 
a synonym to military capabilities of states no longer suffice. Hard power has become too 
simplistic to describe power in world politics and the dissatisfaction with this 
conceptualisation among international relations scholars has led to the inquiries into other 
forms of power. Joseph Nye (1990; 2004a; 2004b; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011) therefore argues 
that due to the upset of global power balance a new understanding of power must be 
established. Thus, he argues that this new type of power is contrast to hard power, and 
proposes that there are three kinds of power: military and economic (both coercive) and 
͚soft poǁeƌ͛ ;NǇe, ϮϬϬϰa, p.ϯϬͿ.  Foƌ NǇe soft poǁeƌ ƌests oŶ ͚the aďilitǇ to shape 
pƌefeƌeŶĐes of otheƌs͛ ďǇ ͚Đo-optiŶg people ƌatheƌ thaŶ ĐoeƌĐiŶg theŵ͛ ;NǇe, ϮϬϬϰa, p.ϱͿ. 
However, soft power is not merely the influence over others because influence also rests on 
the hard power of coercion (Lukes, 2005). Thus, soft power always depends on the context 
of the relationships. It is a system of relations, which states build with their international 
interlocutors. Soft power, therefore, constitutes a web of relations that form political 
subjects by means of communication management and information sharing, performed by 
the state in conjunction with multiple, subnational, international and multinational actors.  
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The sociological, rather than economical approach of the international relations utilised, 
appreciates the domestic and the transnational society in which the states are embedded 
(McCall & Simmons, 1978; Wendt, 1994). This, undoubtedly, reflects the general 
relationship between the dependency and identity formation. Nevertheless much depends 
on the nature of the state - some states are more dependent on the domestic than 
international society, while others are committed to project domestic welfare onto foreign 
policies (Lumsdaine, 1993). The new facets of twenty first century power, thus, demonstrate 
that the economic interests are only achievable within the wider framework of socio-
cultural and humanitarian projects (Nye, 2011). Possession of either military force or 
extractive resources alone cannot bring desirable results (Wilson, 2008). The application of 
military force, furthermore, can bring the most negative political implications (Kurlantzick, 
2007). Therefore, by projecting certain narratives a country can meet its aims where the 
traditional use of material resources and capabilities would fail to do so (Nye, 2011). The 
end point of this transformation bestows meaning upon all parts of the whole. The effect of 
this structure is selectivity. Here one must distinguish between the story and the plot, 
where the story is what happened in life and the plot is the way the author has presented it 
happening (Nye, 2004). The practice of international relations involves constructing plots 
from the raw material or story of political history, intentionally filtering it as the situation 
demands (Keohane & Nye, 1998). Narratives, therefore, are politically efficacious since an 
overall heroic or inspiring national plot may mask any episodes that contradict with the plot 
(Nye, 2004). However, since other actors in the system will be performing similar acts of 
narrative projection, great powers must constantly redefine and adapt the narrative in 
response to others. Communications and actions as well as in response to critical events 
which may appear to contradict the initial narrative (Keohane & Nye, 1998). 
Within soft power interdependent logic is shaped by immaterial factors – perception, 
iŵagiŶatioŶ, Ŷaƌƌatiǀes aŶd ƌole ideŶtities ;NǇe, ϭϵϵϬͿ. NǇe͛s ĐoŶĐept of soft poǁeƌ ďuilds 
on Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argument that power also operates by creating non-
deĐisioŶs. NǇe͛s ;ϭϵϵϬͿ theoƌǇ ƌeǀolǀes aƌouŶd the ǀieǁ that poǁeƌ eǆists Ŷot oŶlǇ iŶ the 
environment of conflict but also within consensus of interests. This for him defines soft 
power - managing interdependence, inciting spill-over effects and ultimately cementing the 
intra-regional communication - and is huge part of foreign policies of all major global 
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powers. This dimension of power highlights the importance of controlling the narrative. 
Therefore, Generally, Nye (1990) stresses that soft power unlike hard power includes 
intangible resources such as ideas, values, culture, and perceived legitimacy of policies.  
Steven Lukes (2005) and Michael Foucault (2002) are particularly prominent in illuminating 
this aspeĐt of poǁeƌ. Lukes iŶtƌoduĐes the ͚thiƌd faĐe of poǁeƌ͛ ďǇ aƌguiŶg that the aďseŶĐe 
of conflicting interests does not necessarily mean the absence of power relationship. 
Furthermore, he argues that the most effective manifestation of power is when the conflict 
of interest is prevented from arising (Lukes, 2005, p.27). He bases his argument on the 
ŶotioŶ of ƌeal states͛ iŶteƌests aŶd the uŶĐoŶsĐious deǀiatioŶ fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh is Đƌedited to the 
͚thiƌd faĐe of poǁeƌ͛. It also ĐoŶtaiŶs the possibility that the subject must recognise these 
interests (Berenskoetter, 2007). He ĐƌitiƋues Dahl͛s appƌoaĐh ďǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ the tiŵiŶg of 
ǁheŶ the poǁeƌ is eǆeƌĐised. OŶe state ĐaŶ ĐhaŶge otheƌ states͛ pƌefeƌeŶĐes ďǇ ĐhaŶgiŶg 
the situation by which the subject then changes the preferred strategy. Lukes (2005) argues 
that it is possiďle to ĐhaŶge the suďjeĐt͛s pƌefeƌeŶĐes ďefoƌe the pƌefeƌeŶĐes aƌe 
determined. This dimension of power is missed by Dahl (1961). Foucault (1982) similarly 
argues that poweƌ ĐaŶ ďe ͚pƌoduĐtiǀe͛, ͚disĐipliŶaƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚pastoƌal͛ aŶd foĐuses oŶ the poǁeƌ-
knowledge nexus – the mechanism by which expert knowledge is produced. Therefore, he 
argues that power mechanisms are visible through historical analysis (Foucault, 1982; 2002) 
and highlights that theǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe oǀeƌĐoŵe. His aƌguŵeŶt diffeƌs fƌoŵ Lukes͛ iŶ the faĐt 
that the latter focuses on interests, whereas the former discusses the formation of 
identities.  Lukes and Foucault, however, both see power dynamics in terms of shifting 
intensity rather than a zero sum distribution (Berenskoetter, 2007). Their argument, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, takes upoŶ the ŶotioŶ of Dahl͛s ;ϭϵϲϭͿ ͚poǁeƌ oǀeƌ͛ appƌoaĐh aŶd theƌefoƌe 
leaves no room for a positive notion of empowerment found in Ardent (1998) and Moriss 
(2002).  
Joseph NǇe ;ϮϬϬϰďͿ ďuilds oŶ Lukes͛ ͚thiƌd faĐe poǁeƌ͛ aŶd suŵŵaƌises iŶteƌŶatioŶal soft 
power as the ability to attract people and shape their ideas, thereby securing their 
obedience. Hence, soft power resources are information, he writes that soft power ͚is the 
aďilitǇ to attƌaĐt aŶd […] seduĐtioŶ is alǁaǇs ŵoƌe attƌaĐtiǀe thaŶ ĐoeƌĐioŶ, aŶd ŵaŶǇ ǀalues 
like deŵoĐƌaĐǇ, huŵaŶ ƌights aŶd iŶdiǀidual oppoƌtuŶities aƌe deeplǇ seduĐtiǀe͛ ;NǇe, 
ϮϬϬϰa, p.ϲ; p.ϭϱͿ. NǇe͛s aƌgues that the states that possess ͚ŵultiple channels of 
21 
 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ that help to fƌaŵe the issue͛ aƌe ŵost likelǇ ͚to ďe ŵoƌe attƌaĐtiǀe aŶd gaiŶ 
soft poǁeƌ iŶ the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ age͛ ;NǇe, ϮϬϬϰa, p.ϯϭͿ. Theƌefoƌe, shapiŶg Ŷaƌƌatiǀes 
becomes essential.  
Alas, soft power lacks structure that hard power possesses. It works by the attraction of 
ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶg otheƌs of the appeal of oŶe͛s ideas. AttƌaĐtioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, is a suďjeĐtiǀe 
experience which raises the question of when the attraction happens in international 
relations (Mattern, 2007). This question in the context of soft power arises due to the 
academic desire of theoretical clarity as well as due to the need to measure instances of the 
practical uses of soft power. For states which intend to utilise soft power, successful 
strategy depends on the ability to understand how to make their idea and their image 
attractive to the target audience. Janice Bially Mattern (2007) develops such a framework of 
power of attraction, which ultimately can sustain empirical enquiry of international relations 
practices. She suggests that the attraction is constructed through the communicative 
eǆĐhaŶge. The ͚ƌealitǇ͛ of attƌaĐtiǀeŶess ͚is a soĐioliŶguistiĐ ĐoŶstƌuĐt͛ ;MatteƌŶ, ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϵϵͿ 
which is based on the constructed truth of the appeal of some idea and is one interpretation 
among many, that has crystallised through a communicative process. Thus, international 
aĐtoƌs iŶstead of peƌsuadiŶg eaĐh otheƌ of the oŶlǇ tƌue ŵeaŶiŶg of ͚ƌealitǇ͛, fight ǀeƌďallǇ 
over it using representative force (ibid, 2007). Representative force, therefore, is a power 
tool that opeƌates thƌough the stƌuĐtuƌe of aŶǇ souƌĐe͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe of ƌealitǇ. Naƌƌatiǀes aƌe 
frameworks that allow humans to connect apparently unconnected political or economic 
phenomena around casual transformation (Nye, 2008). Soft power is, therefore, often 
liŶked ǁith puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs oƌ ͚ŵaƌketiŶg Đaƌƌied out ďǇ states aŶd diƌeĐted at foƌeigŶ 
audieŶĐes͛ ;AǀgeƌiŶos, ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϭϭϳͿ. IŶdeed, ŵaŶǇ teƌŵs aŶd stƌategies ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶ the 
public relations field are applied to international power relations. Nye (2004b) refers to 
these strategies as soft power tools. Foremost among these is the idea of managing the 
ďƌaŶd of pƌoduĐt oƌ seƌǀiĐes. IŶ the Đase of soft poǁeƌ stƌategies, the ͚pƌoduĐt͛ is the 
government and its policies, thus a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŵage aŶd ƌeputatioŶ aƌe Đalled a 
͚ŶatioŶal ďƌaŶd͛ ;AǀgeƌiŶos, ϮϬϬϵͿ. NatioŶal ďƌaŶdiŶg is ͚the ĐoŶteǆt iŶ ǁhiĐh ŵessages aƌe 
ƌeĐeiǀed, Ŷot the ŵessages theŵselǀes͛ ;AŶholt, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϮϳϮͿ.  
The considerations of the strategy of deploying soft power are additionally essential. Nye 
(2004a) argues that that it is important to stockpile soft power. Inherent in this logic is the 
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ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of the tƌeatŵeŶt of soft poǁeƌ as it ought to ďe ŵilitaƌǇ poǁeƌ, ͚soŵethiŶg that 
should be kept in reserve and ƌeadǇ to go iŶ situatioŶs ǁheŶ appƌopƌiate͛ ;MatteƌŶ, ϮϬϬϳ, p. 
117). However, where attractiveness is concerned, soft power is a subject of representative 
force and stockpiling is counterproductive. As a representative force it is only beneficial to 
the source if the object of soft power continues to feel the impact on their perceptions. 
Indeed, from the perspective of deployment of power, hard power and soft power are 
ƌelated ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ďoth appƌoaĐhes to aĐhieǀiŶg oŶe͛s puƌpose ďǇ affeĐtiŶg the 
behaviour of others. People are attracted to others because of different reasons, sometimes 
it is because of the command of power and sometimes it is attraction through inspiration 
(Nye, 2008). However, the intimidator can have a vision, belief in their cause and the 
reputation or the image of success that attracts others despite their bullying behaviour 
(Nye, 2008). Hard power and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with 
each other. Since it is outcomes not resources policy-makers are ultimately concerned 
about, one must pay more attention to the strategies of power relations.  
Since Joseph Nye (1990) introduced the idea of soft power, the opinion that traditional hard 
poǁeƌ is the oŶlǇ ǁaǇ to aĐhieǀe oŶe͛s poliĐǇ goals iŶ gloďal politiĐs has diminished. Power 
is more perceived as a process rather than hard resources and this process can be controlled 
by appropriate strategies. Strategies are essential in choosing power resources successfully. 
The institutional framework in which smart power operates is thus essential. Therefore, 
Joseph Nye (2011) goes beyond the scope of soft power theory and argues that a smart 
power narrative is the basis of successful policy making. It was first defined by Nye (2004b) 
to counter the misconception that hard power or soft power alone can produce effective 
foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ outĐoŵes. He giǀes a Đleaƌ defiŶitioŶ of sŵaƌt poǁeƌ ǁhiĐh is ͚Ŷeitheƌ haƌd 
Ŷoƌ soft, it is ďoth͛ ;NǇe, ϮϬϭϭ, p.ϮϭϵͿ. Therefore, it is an ability of the states to combine 
elements of soft power and hard power in ways that are mutually reinforcing and in such a 
ǁaǇ that the state͛s iŶteƌests aƌe adǀaŶĐed suĐĐessfullǇ aŶd ƌesouƌĐefullǇ ;NǇe, ϮϬϬϴͿ. NǇe 
then goes on to clarify that smart power is:  
͚… aŶ appƌoaĐh that uŶdeƌsĐoƌes the ŶeĐessitǇ of stƌoŶg ŵilitaƌǇ ďut also iŶǀests 
heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels to expand American (or 
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others countries) influence and establish the legitimacy of AŵeƌiĐaŶ aĐtioŶ͛ ;NǇe, 
2006, p.6). 
Smart power is not about maximising power but it is about finding ways to combine hard 
and soft power resources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion. 
This strategy relates as a means to an end; that requires clarity about preferred outcomes, 
resources, and tactics for their use. Preferences and strategy in this case are linked. If 
preferences rank outcomes by their desirability in a given political environment, then 
strategy is a plan of a state͛s effoƌts to Đoŵe as Đlose to desiƌaďle outĐoŵes as possiďle. 
Unlike the two types of power, smart power is an evaluative concept (Nye, 2011). Smart 
power has its roots in an American context and thus stresses that it goes beyond soft and 
hard as a method to the use of power that gives decision-makers a chance to choose the 
best way to address a specific international issues. This is because it focuses on the 
individual context of power relations and it challenges the very problem of power 
conversion. 
Smart power strategy, therefore, can be viewed as the practical art of balancing the demand 
for hegemony and international image building (Kubalkova, 1998; Barker, 2003). It is an 
informed way of building foreign policy. A corollary of this argument is that without 
addressing the balance between the phenomenon of power and human morality one 
cannot successfully address the phenomenon of international political change. The 
combination of hard power and soft power tools looks at the way in which power structures 
affect patterns of normative change in international power relations. These control the way 
in which a set of norms affects power structures (Barkin, 2003). Specifically it studies the 
uses and distributions of power and it addresses the issues of change in international 
relations in a way that neither hard power nor soft power can.  
Alas, the academic smart power debate although firmly rooted in the historical, economic 
and regional-political contexts of international relations, has little contribution to the 
assessment of power in a global market. Although many theoretical statements have been 
made about the smart power strategies, or foreign policy directions of great powers (Nye, 
2008; 2011; Ding 2008), there is a gap in the analysis of the global energy market. Therefore, 
when a smart power strategy is applied to the energy market, one can conclude that 
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because of the nature of natural gas supply infrastructures, consumer states are dependent 
on suppliers. Consequently, they are potentially vulnerable to the suppliers taking 
advantage of that dependency for political and economic goals (Shaffer, 2011). Since energy 
is a gloďal ĐoŵŵoditǇ, eaĐh ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s deŵaŶd has aŶ effeĐt oŶ supplǇ foƌ all ĐoŶsuŵeƌs 
(Shaffer, 2011). The dramatic expansion of the use of natural gas fosters long-term linkages 
and dependencies between supplier and consumer countries, and thus there is more room 
for debate around the dynamics of political power. However, despite the centrality of 
resource power to the international security and the grandiose effects energy has on 
domestic political agenda, academics have paid limited attention to publishing research on 
the topic (Lynn-Jones & Miller, 1995). Even less attention is given to exploring the power 
debate within the energy market. The prominent international relations and security studies 
journal International Security has published only eight articles devoted to these issues (data 
from Shaffer, 2011 see Walske, 1977; Paarlberg, 1978; Fagen, 1979; Dafter, 1980; Deece, 
1980; Lieber, 1980, Gustafson, 1982; Lieber, 1992). Moreover, topics that have been 
eǆaŵiŶed iŶ ŵajoƌ jouƌŶals iŶĐlude OPEC͛s use of the ͚oil ǁeapoŶ͛; ŶuĐleaƌ eŶeƌgǇ 
production and proliferation of nuclear weapons; the role of oil in intrastate and interstate 
conflicts among others. These, however, do not provide a comprehensive look at the 
interactions either between energy and international politics or specifically between gas 
producers and gas consumers by focusing on the dynamics of the energy market (Nye & 
Deece, 1981Ϳ. Theƌefoƌe, a Ŷuŵďeƌ of issues aďout ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ states͛ eŶeƌgǇ aŶd 
foreign policies need to be examined that include increased international interests, energy 
nationalism, and the relations between the importers and exporters, particularly in the gas 
market.  
It can even be claimed that smart power is the result of foreign policy application with 
economic goals. The process of transformation of the energy market, therefore, is 
accountable for the conversion of power beyond hard and soft into a method, the way in 
which it is exercised in different global regions to achieve economic aims. To contextualise 
smart power module to be applicable to energy diplomacy one needs to visualise a chart of 
power. To identify the discussion of duality of power, one is invited to imagine a 
mathematical chart where the X axis is representative of soft power and Y axis - hard power. 
If one is to imagine it is possible to quantify diplomacy with hard and soft power coefficients 
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of both axes, as shown in the Chart 1, one would unavoidably recognise that the application 
of power can contain both the elements of hard and soft power. The example shows two 
distinct diplomacy approaches in region A and region B. In the case of the region A (blue 
data marker) diplomacy uses pronounced hard power approaches to advance its foreign 
policy goals and economic gains in the region. On the other hand, region B (red data marker) 
exemplifies classic soft power diplomacy. Due to the complex nature of power, the chart 
shows that the both cases hold elements of hard and soft, the difference being, one is more 
pronounced than the other as shown in Chart 1.  
 Chart 1  
Smart power can be identified as the only method of measuring power in any international 
context or region within the global energy market because it appreciates the duality of 
power by states.   
Therefore, according to Nye (2011), smart power can be empirically measured because it 
provides answers to the following five points. Firstly, it concerns itself with what type of 
goals or outcomes are preferred by the states as it means setting conditions by 
understanding the context of the relationship that would encourage compromises. Smart 
power strategy cannot be exercised alone, it requires partners and allies. Suzanne Nossel 
(2004) wrote an article in Foreign Affairs tƌǇiŶg foƌ the fiƌst tiŵe to theoƌise ͚sŵaƌt poǁeƌ͛ 
and proposing to renew the doctrine of internationalism and to restore the values of 
multiculturalism. In her article she advocates the revival of the UN as the only translational 
organisation that is designed to provide multilateral engagement on global issues. The UN is 
a forum where state delegates are able to take initiative on key issues and work behind the 
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scenes before formal debate begins to persuade others without forcing other governments 
to capitulate publically its demands (Nossel, 2004).   
Secondly, once the context of the relationship is understood, smart power strategy then 
engages with the understanding of what resources the state has in it disposition. This 
situation asks not only for an accurate account of all the power resources available but also 
how their uses will impact on the relationship context. Hilary Clinton (2009) during her 
confirmation hearing has explicitly endorsed smart power as a new American foreign policy 
strategy:  
͚ǁe ŵust use ǁhat has ďeeŶ Đalled ͚sŵaƌt poǁeƌ͛ the full ƌaŶge of tools at ouƌ 
disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – picking the 
ƌight tool oƌ ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of tools foƌ eaĐh situatioŶ.͛ 
Thirdly, the position and preferences of the target states are assessed. It is essential to 
eŶgage iŶ the suƌǀeǇ of the oppoŶeŶts͛ thoughts desiƌes aŶd ƌesouƌĐes. NǇe ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
describes the contextual intelligence of the world leaders using smart power. For example, 
former Chinese president Hu Jintao had reflected an erudite analysis of the current 
international political situation and had displayed a balanced integrated array of 
iŶstƌuŵeŶts to aĐhieǀe ChiŶa͛s Ŷaƌƌoǁ politiĐal goals as ǁell as theiƌ ŶatioŶal purposes 
;DiŶg, ϮϬϬϴͿ. ChiŶa͛s PeaĐeful ‘ise has Đƌeated ǁhat is Đalled a ŵultifaĐeted Đhaƌŵ 
campaign offering African leaders financial support and technological assistance as well as 
high-level attention.   
The third theme leads to the fourth point of inquiry – which are the forms of power most 
likely to succeed? Smart power is recognition of the different forms of power and the tools 
and instruments that power can employ. It also depends on the context:  
͚… poǁeƌ todaǇ is distƌiďuted aŵoŶg ĐouŶtƌies iŶ a pattern that resembles a 
complex, tree-dimensional chess game. On the top board, military power is largely 
unipolar. But on the middle board, economic power among states is already 
multipolar, with the United states, Europe and Japan representing a majority of 
ǁoƌld eĐoŶoŵiĐ output, aŶd ChiŶa͛s dƌaŵatiĐ gƌoǁth ƌapidlǇ ŵakiŶg it the fouƌth 
ŵajoƌ plaǇeƌ͛;NǇe, ϮϬϬϴ, p.ϱϲͿ  
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Lastly, Nye (2011) argues it is important to understand what the probability of success is, 
both in the grand strategy level, and in the context of any individual influence attempt. A 
clear assessment of policy success also requires an understanding of domestic institutions 
and public attitudes. The accomplishment of smart power policy can only be achieved if the 
limitations of international and domestic situations are realistically assessed and the policy 
objectives are adjusted accordingly.  
Joseph NǇe͛s poǁeƌ deďate has appealed to a ǀast Ŷuŵďeƌ of aĐadeŵiĐs, jouƌŶalists aŶd 
policy makers (Mattern, 2007, Kiseleva, 2015). The attraction of soft power has inevitably 
contributed to the attraction of the power debate as a whole. Soft power has become a 
prominent term between policy makers not only in the developed Western countries, but 
also in countries with no or little soft power tools by hegemonic standards like China (Nye, 
2013). However, as the discourse of hegemony continues to exercise power of coercion, 
countries wishing to control global information narratives are forced to employ some 
degree of smart power strategies. 
Further, the thesis explores the case of Russian energy and foreign policy and turns to 
examine whether Russian policy makers have responded to the appeal of smart power use. 
Due to Russia being a country outside the Western developed world and due to the lack of 
political power research within Russian energy diplomacy, the thesis must generate its own 
disĐouƌse of sŵaƌt poǁeƌ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to NǇe͛s fiǀe poiŶts. The folloǁiŶg Đhapteƌ of the thesis 
concentrates on the last, fifth point and it give the reader the assessment of Russian 
domestic energy policy. It also identifies the limitations of international and domestic 
situations that have influenced on how the Kremlin approaches energy diplomacy and 
formulates relevant policies.  
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Russian energy diplomacy formation: internal and external factors 
To tease out the patterns of Russian international influence in the context of current Russia-
EU gas relations, one needs to look at the historical and geographical properties of Russian 
international identity and it is as PƌesideŶt PutiŶ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ stated the eŶgiŶe to ƌeďuild ‘ussia͛s 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đapaďilities aŶd status. The fƌaŵeǁoƌk of the KƌeŵliŶ aŶd Gazpƌoŵ͛s 
ƌelatioŶship, aĐts as a ĐatalǇseƌ to the Gazpƌoŵ͛s eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ 
(Williamson, 2000; Dixit, 2009; Locatelli, 2014). The latter is always in the unique position of 
being an executor of Russian foreign policy preferences while still attempting to maintain 
commercial credibility and draw revenue internationally. To understand the intricacies of 
Gazpƌoŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ the EU ƌegioŶal gas ŵaƌkets aŶd the patteƌŶs of eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith 
its European customer states, one must draw attention to how Russian energy policy is 
shaped. The domestic and international factors are central to the performance of gas 
diplomacy and are fundamental in determining the engagement of either hard or soft power 
strategies.  
WheŶ Vladiŵiƌ PutiŶ Đaŵe to poǁeƌ as the PƌesideŶt iŶ ϭϵϵϵ, the ŵajoƌitǇ of ‘ussia͛s oil 
and gas production was in private hands. This time is desĐƌiďed as ǁheŶ ͚the state let 
stƌategiĐ ŵaŶageŵeŶt of the Ŷatuƌal ƌesouƌĐe Đoŵpleǆ slip fƌoŵ its haŶds͛ ;Balzeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. 
The energy reform in 1999 left the Russian gas sector with hierarchical governance structure 
(Aslund, 1999). This sector was considered to be too important to be left to free internal 
market and state controlled planning was considered to be the most efficient way of 
retaining ownership and managing Russian resources (Balzer, 2006). The gas sector thus is 
characterised by the hierarchical coordination mechanism (Locatelli, 2014, p.54). 
Structurally it is categorised by the presence of Gazprom that has quasi monopoly over 
production of gas and full monopoly over transmission of gas (domestic and foreign pipeline 
networks) (Gazprom, 2014a). Simultaneously, the Russian state earns substantial 
percentage of its GDP through its 51 per cent shares of the company (Ericson, 2009). Alexey 
Miller (2010) presented the vision behind this model at the conference in Orenburg; it is to 
turn Gazprom into a big, vertically integrated company that's a leader in the world energy 
market. Therefore, this institutional context enables Gazprom to assume the role of 
͚NatioŶal ChaŵpioŶ͛ ;PutiŶ, ϭϵϵϳͿ that seƌǀes state eŶds iŶteƌŶatioŶallǇ aŶd doŵestiĐallǇ.  
29 
 
Much of Gazpƌoŵ͛s aĐtiǀitǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶallǇ is fouŶded oƌ is ƌeaĐtiǀe to the KƌeŵliŶ͛s 
domestic policies. Russian energy establishment is informed by the dogmas surviving from 
the Soviet period, which boil down to three major points - a strong preference for state 
ownership, insistence on a state monopoly and faith in the inherent advantages of central 
state management (Dienes & Shabad, 1979; Gaddy, 2003; Bradshaw & Bond, 2004; Aslund, 
2006). These characteristics besides being communist or socialist in nature also are 
apparent manifestations of ingrained governance habits. The centralised governance 
module allows the state to shape energy development strategies to ally with 
aforementioned characteristics and maintain the status quo over the energy sector. 
Habitually, the state also operates the conservative economic module which advocates and 
defends extremely low domestic energy prices and non-monetary relations. Russian 
industry regulatory measures have focused on quantity rather than profit criteria, which 
mean that Russian industry has access to inexpensive and stable supply of gas. This supply in 
terms has ensured the continued operation of alternate industries, gas being the main input 
in domestic electricity generation (Woodruff, 1999; Locatelli, 2014). 
The central government is aware that it is more effective persuading domestic companies 
than their foreign counterparts to continue to provide cheap energy for domestic industry 
use because the former can be rewarded with tax breaks (Jones Luong, 2000).Therefore, 
uŶdeƌ these ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, PutiŶ͛s adŵiŶistƌatioŶ is eǀeŶ less likelǇ to alloǁ foƌeigŶ 
investment in energy development. This in term jeopardises the validity of the exploration 
projects such as the Kovykta gas field in Eastern Siberia where British Petroleum licences 
were discontinued and gas development project on Sakhalin Island off the Pacific Coast 
where Royal Dutch Shell had controlling shares. The latter was discontinued due to the 
environmental concerns (Shaffer, 2001). This tendency also correlates with Soviet 
unreconstructed protectionism policy (Aslund, 2006), which advocates that the magnitude 
and location of reserves is a matter of national security. Alas, this means that the 
development of the new fields, particularly in the Arctic and Eastern Siberian regions, which 
ǁill ĐoŶtƌiďute ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ to the sustaiŶaďilitǇ of ‘ussia͛s ƌesouƌĐes, ƌeŵaiŶ iŶĐoŵplete 
and unachievable.   
It is likely that the strongest motive to favour such economically irrational decisions is the 
new patriotism which is encouraged by the current political elites (Popov, 2008). Although, 
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foreign investment would undoubtedly contribute to the increase of gas selling price and 
improve productive capacity through direct competition and investment, the Kremlin opts 
to forgo financial rewards for political gain –that is sustaining domestic electoral support. 
Indeed, the approach of the increased state control is politically very successful – the 
expansion of the power of Russian state over oil and gas sectors and banishment of the 
foreign investors had proven to be very popular among the population that viewed the 
privatisation of 1990s very negatively (Hill, 2003; Gorodetsky, 2003). The regret over the 
disiŶtegƌatioŶ of the “oǀiet UŶioŶ aŶd ŶatioŶ͛s Ŷostalgia foƌ the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s greatness, its 
economic and military might is wildly prevalent among both the older and younger 
generations (WCIOM, 2005). Throughout the 1990s reform decade, the Russian population 
suffered a psychological trauma over the loss of greatness and international influence of the 
country. The nationalisation of the energy sector therefore enabled people to rate their 
ĐouŶtƌǇ higheƌ aŶd the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s suĐĐess iŶ gas pƌoduĐtioŶ staƌted to feed iŶto the idea of 
‘ussia͛s leadiŶg ƌole iŶ supplǇiŶg the ƌest of the ǁoƌld with fuel and energy. Thus, state 
monopoly over gas sector and obstructing foreign investment appears to be economically 
irrational decision may be justified by political rationale and it further contributes to the 
maximisation of sovereignty that translates in even more control over gas sector.  
The improvement of the domestic economy by subsidies with cheap gas has enabled Russia 
to strive for international superpower status and the nationalisation of energy trade is a 
mere echo of the Soviet energy policy agenda. It is largely because of surplus in oil and gas 
that the Soviet Union had been able to expand its foreign trade as it had had. The growing 
demand for energy export added powerfully to the growing strain between military and 
economic objectives in Soviet resource allocation. Soviet military presence and power in 
Eastern Europe increased against a deteriorating economic performance at home. Soviet 
Union was always willing to continue the style of control in Eastern Europe that had been 
developed and was in place since the end of the World War II. The essential condition 
behind this policy was an uninterrupted supply of oil and gas to Eastern Europe. Moscow 
committed to rapid increase in shipments of gas and electricity for the purpose of stabilising 
East European dependence on Soviet energy and gradually moving towards what Moscow 
regarded as a sounder and broader division of roles. 
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However, despite the firm willingness to hold the line on energy exports in Eastern Europe, 
Soviet Union had never committed to becoming a supplier of last resort. By the end of the 
1960s Soviet Union had begun to take a drastically different position to oil and gas 
shipments to Eastern Europe by claiming they had not been in Soviet interests due to the 
high opportunity costs (Gustafson, 1981). The Soviet reports implied that East European 
energy problems were ultimately their own to solve. The choice in this case was not 
between guns and butter, but between two different definitions of the prerequisites of 
national strength (Meyerhoff, 1980). Furthermore, the leverage the Kremlin held by 
sacrificing their energy to Eastern European market without any apparent profit, did not buy 
them social peace or political stability in the region. As a result, Soviet started managing 
their relationships with Eastern European clients by direct pressure rather than subsidise 
and economic cooperation, consequently, feeling that Kremlin became a hostage of the 
Eastern European energy problems (Burger, 1979; Gustafson, 1981). 
Russian foreign policy in new geographical Eastern Europe takes into consideration 
sovereignty of Ukraine and Belarus and exhibits resemblances to the Soviet energy policy. 
Theƌe is a peƌĐeptioŶ of ‘ussia ďeiŶg the ͚Big Bƌotheƌ͛ due to the, liŶguistiĐ, ƌeligious, 
traditional similarities and shared historical roots of the region (Puglisi, 2003; Rodgers, 
2006). The term itself though implies that Russian government perceives the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although culturally close, still inferior and in 
need of a constant political and economic guidance. Therefore, Russia has always sought to 
ďe ͚a leadiŶg foƌĐe iŶ the foƌŵatioŶ of a Ŷeǁ sǇsteŵ of iŶteƌstate politiĐal aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
relations on post-UŶioŶ teƌƌitoƌǇ͛ ;BƌzeziŶski & “ulliǀaŶ, ϭϵϵϳ, p.ϮϵϬͿ. This strategic and 
economic partnership applies foremost to Ukraine. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine remained for Russia an area of natural interest (Wilson, 2000).  
In economic terms, Russia is tied to Ukraine with Soviet era gas networks. The vast majority 
of gas pipelines make Ukraine the largest gas transit state of Russian gas to the EU. Gas is 
transported along five main lines – Bratstvo (Brotherhood), Soyuz (Union), Urengoy Center, 
Progress/Yamburg and Severnoe Siyanie (Northern Lights) (Energy Information 
Administration, 2014). Simultaneously, unlike the oil market (see: Perovic, Orttung & 
Wenger, 2007, p.71-75), the Ukrainian gas sector has maintained its independence from 
Gazprom despite its numerous attempts to acquire the gas transit system (GTS). Therefore, 
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under this existing pattern, Russia delivers gas to Europe having no control over gas 
transportation. Use of the same pipelines makes it impossible to cut off gas to Ukraine 
without interrupting deliveries to Europe (Chernavsky & Eismont, 2012). At the same time, 
folloǁiŶg the ideologǇ of the ͚Big Bƌotheƌ͛ Gazpƌoŵ suďsidised the UkƌaiŶiaŶ eĐoŶoŵǇ ǁith 
lower than market prices gas throughout the 1990s and the first part of 2000s. Until 2005 
Ukraine bought Russian gas at the price of $50 Mcm which on average was a half of what 
the EU countries were paying (Gazprom, 2014). The gas relations therefore have been tied 
to the Russian conservative economic module, allowing Ukrainian industry to integrate with 
world markets and the state experience economic growth. This connection is viewed by 
ŵaŶǇ iŶ KƌeŵliŶ as the last pillaƌ of ‘ussia͛s staďilitǇ aŶd poǁeƌ that ŵust Ŷot ďe 
undermined if Russia is to be perceived as an energy superpower (Tsygankov, 2014). 
UkƌaiŶe͛s uŶiƋue positioŶ as a gas tƌaŶspoƌteƌ giǀes it a tƌaŶsit ǁeapoŶ against Russia. 
When in winter 2005 Gazprom announced a price increase, Ukraine refused to pay the price 
of $230 Mcm. The gas supply was curtailed to Ukraine, while still transiting gas to Europe. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, the tƌaŶsit gas ǁas theŶ diǀeƌted to UkƌaiŶe͛s domestic use and as a consequence 
several EU countries experienced fuel shortages. This 2005 gas crisis set precedent to 
farther Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. In 2007 Gazprom cut gas supply to Ukraine for a 
brief period but after the latter threated to divert EU transit gas, the two sides agreed on an 
annual price of $179 Mcm (Gazprom, 2014). Same scenario repeated in 2009, when 
Ukrainian Naftogaz refused to transport gas to the EU after Gazprom cut off its gas 
deliveries to Ukraine due to debts and inability to negotiate a new price agreement. At this 
point apparent similarities between Russian and Soviet energy policies can be seen. 
Although Kremlin views Kiev as economically and politically inferior and in need of subsidies, 
it has never committed to become a supplier of last resort. Once Ukraine exhibited 
willingness to employ their transit leverage against Russia, it triggered the sense of Gazprom 
aŶd ‘ussiaŶ eŶeƌgǇ seĐtoƌ ďeiŶg a hostage to UkƌaiŶe͛s eŶeƌgǇ pƌoďleŵs. To eǆteƌŵiŶate 
the need for constant debt negotiations President Putin suggested an exchange for 
oǁŶeƌship stakes iŶ UkƌaiŶe͛s GT“ foƌ stakes iŶ ‘ussiaŶ gas pƌoduĐtioŶ ;KƌopatĐheǀa, ϮϬϭϭ; 
Heinrich, 2014). Therefore, from an economic perspective, Russian policy is dominated by 
the long-term calculations of reaping more profit from higher gas prices to Ukraine. The 
Russian MFA announced that increasing prices was a major element of emancipation that 
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would help to remove the rudiments of the past (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RF, 2007). 
Although this violates the same economic module that Kremlin favours in domestic gas 
distribution, it would undoubtedly liberate Russia from Ukrainian economic pressure. 
‘ussia͛s goal to iŶĐƌease gas pƌiĐes ĐaŶŶot ďe solelǇ ĐoŶsideƌed as a tool to ͚puŶish͛ Ukƌaine, 
but is also dictated by cost- benefit calculations in bilateral relations. Russia, due to its 
depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ eŶeƌgǇ tƌade, is ǀulŶeƌaďle to ďoth UkƌaiŶe͛s iŶaďilitǇ to paǇ ŵaƌket gas 
prices and to its willingness to use gas transit as a weapon (Phillips, 2009). 
IŶ geopolitiĐal teƌŵs, UkƌaiŶe is ǀieǁed as the ͚HeaƌtlaŶd͛ ;MaĐkiŶdeƌ, ϭϵϭϵͿ aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶs 
the ͚supeƌpoǁeƌ͛ status ‘ussia is iŶteƌested iŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ UkƌaiŶe. This 
ambition can be summarised by the geostrategic theory that one who controls the 
Heartland controls the world (Mackinder, 1919, p.194). As a large borderline territory 
Ukraine serves to protect Russia from potential marine and overland military intervention 
(Tsygankov, 2014). The geopolitical value of Ukraine and its historical ties with the Russian 
nation, encourages Kremlin to extend same patriotic dogmas established domestically. The 
ďǇgoŶe deǀelopŵeŶts aŶd the Cold Waƌ afteƌŵath haǀe geŶeƌated ‘ussia aŶd the West͛s 
ŵistƌust iŶ eaĐh otheƌ͛s iŶteŶtioŶs aŶd had also a ǁeighty input into strengthening the 
exclusionary value dynamics. 
Despite the strategic and economical attractiveness of Ukraine, the Russo-Ukrainian 
ƌelatioŶs ĐhaŶge ǁith eǀeƌǇ eleĐted pƌesideŶt, hoǁeǀeƌ, UkƌaiŶe͛s eŶtitleŵeŶt to Đheap gas 
remains unchanged (Energy Information Agency, 2007). The most significant milestone 
would be the expansion of NATO and the US support of Ukrainian membership attempts. 
ViĐtoƌ YushĐheŶko͛s eŶdeaǀouƌ to joiŶ NATO had ďeeŶ deŶouŶĐed as aŶti –Russian policy, 
violating trust and established regional cooperation (Medvedev, 2009), and Russia began to 
apply pressures onhis administration. Furthermore, what exacerbated the situation was the 
involvement of European governments in Ukrainian elections with considerable financial 
and political assistance. Kremlin saw that its gas subsidies to Ukraine were not paying off, 
official Kiev was further distancing itself from Russia. The shift in policy priorities in the area 
is a constant characteristic to both Soviet and Russian gas diplomacy.  The cooling in Russia-
UkƌaiŶiaŶ eŶeƌgǇ ƌelatioŶs had ďeĐoŵe appaƌeŶt afteƌ UkƌaiŶe͛s atteŵpts to joiŶ NATO aŶd 
due to the EU interest in Ukraine after Eastern enlargement in 2004 (Trenin, 2004). Russian 
energy policy thus had been revised to address the issue at hand and put Ukraine back in 
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liŶe ǁith KƌeŵliŶ͛s geopolitiĐal ǀisioŶ. To eĐho ‘ussiaŶ politiĐal disĐoŶteŶt Gazpƌoŵ ďegaŶ 
fiƌst pƌiĐe iŶĐƌease ŶegotiatioŶs iŶ ϮϬϬϱ eĐhoiŶg “eƌgeǇ Laǀƌoǀ͛s ǁaƌŶiŶg that oŶlǇ fƌieŶds of 
Russia could count on economic and political benefits such as low energy prices, while the 
rest had to be prepared for relations based on market principles (Lavrov, 2007; Sokov, 
2007).  
Respectively, when Viktor Yanukovich was elected president, the bilateral relations 
improved considerably and Russia was able to negotiate new terms for its political 
influence. The Ukrainian leadership reversed the NATO membership course and indicated 
willingness to accommodate Russia in strengthening its presence in Ukrainian politics and 
economy (Tsygankov, 2014). In return, Russia formally invited Ukraine to join the Customs 
Union and reduced gas prices by 30 per cent.  
The relationship between Russia and Ukraine thus depends on two factors. The defining 
characteristic of Russo-Ukrainian relations is the recognition of the third party involvement 
and thus understanding that an interlinked international system exists (Kohout, 2003). 
Therefore, the relations between two actors depend in part on the asymmetric relation 
between them equally as much as on their relations with all other actors in the system 
(Jervis, 1979). Russia's assertiveness and Kremlin's attempts to direct coercion in Ukraine 
reflect a romantic and cynical view of Russian history. Thus, the present Russo-Ukrainian 
relationship however has been at a staggering low. Moscow believes that the overthrow of 
YaŶukoǀǇĐh ǁas aŶ illegitiŵate ƌeǀolt aŶd fuƌtheƌŵoƌe fƌoŵ the ‘ussia͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe the 
West has been hypocritical especially after demonstrating NATO unilateral decision in 
Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 (Lindley-French, 2014). Therefore, one can assert the 
invasion of Crimea was also inherently defensive. Russian overreliance on exports of gas and 
oil to the EU countries (IMF, 2014) with whom it is now engaged in dispute makes it 
especially vulnerable to the carbohydrate price fluctuations. 
Secondly, the conservative domestic policy that is encouraged by the current administration 
and a couscous decision to recreate Russia's historical might in the sphere of direct interest. 
Therefore, Moscow manipulating Ukrainian political situation by using force and pressuring 
Rada to comply with Russian strategic interests, carries domestic political benefits for 
Kremlin but also overweighs the apparent costs of such actions. It is also the domestic 
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domaiŶ of ‘ussiaŶ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ that ƌesoŶates iŶ UkƌaiŶiaŶ Đƌisis. PutiŶ͛s adŵiŶistƌatioŶ is 
notable for its inherently conservative economic doctrine build on the patriotic memory of 
the Soviet superpower. Therefore, Kremlin understandably rejects the notion of Ukraine 
changing and allying with the West and Russian gas diplomacy harks back to a nostalgic age 
when the world of energy commerce quacked in fear of Moscow (Lindley-French, 2014). 
Historically, the shift in Soviet foreign trade priorities in 1970s became apparent and had 
reached unprecedentedly farther since the days of Stalin and Khrushchev. For the first time, 
Soviet leaders became as concerned with international profits as foreign politics (Smith 
Stagen, 2011). Evaluating this argument one finds a Ŷeǁ diŵeŶsioŶ to KƌeŵliŶ͛s foƌeigŶ 
policy, Soviet Union incorporation into the overall network of East-West economic relation, 
from which it profited considerably (Maull, 1983). Thus Soviet Union became fundamentally 
very interested in continuous development of the natural gas agreement and by the end of 
1960s Moscow fully permitted itself to depend on unstable world markets to a surprising 
extend (Hardt & Bresnick, 1980; Gustafson, 1982). During the 1970s, Soviets became major 
energy exporter to Western Europe and world markets. These sales at the time became 
“oǀiet UŶioŶ͛s keǇ souƌĐe of foƌeigŶ ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ. 
The monopoly on gas imports and similarities of diplomatic actions on the European stage 
to the Soviet agenda have undermined confidence in Russia as a partner. This apparent 
paradox of great resource wealth and questionable sustainability and Gazprom being the 
main reference to the gas prices and a political leverage of Kremlin (Bilgin, 2009) creates 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aŵoŶg ‘ussia͛s gas Đustoŵeƌs. Thus, EuƌopeaŶ energy security must foresee 
economic and political impediments of Russia-EU gas relations. The cutting off of all supplies 
by Gazprom to Europe through Ukraine made EU countries to confront the possibility of gas 
supplǇ aŶd ƌaised ƋuestioŶs aďout ‘ussia͛s reliability as a gas partner (Kulikov & Mosolova, 
2009). The dispute that used to be viewed purely commercial one until recently, threatens a 
fresh breakdown in relations between Brussels and Moscow due to geopolitical reasons 
(Gow, 2009). To assess the type of integration in energy security, one needs to understand 
European objectives in the sphere. Therefore, the context in which the term occurs is 
important. European energy security is best characterised by the old concerns of  security of 
supply and price (Khrushcheva, 2011; Aalto & Korkmaz Temel, 2012) and the new wider 
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social concerns in the members states when applied to sub-regional and supranational 
cooperation (Bilgin, 2011; Haukkala, 2013).  
The inter-linkages of the economic, geopolitical and normative dimensions of European 
energy security can be examined by assessing the interactions between demand, supply and 
investment in gas transport projects (Belyi, 2003). These are undoubtedly effecting 
European natural gas market and necessitating substantial political investment in gas 
demand variations (Lise et al, 2008). European indigenous supply cannot fill the gap 
between consumption and production rates and can be only recovered by the import 
contracts. However, Russian-EU relations can be characterised by asymmetric 
interdependence – the EU is more important for Russia than Russia is for the EU (Dhaka, 
2009). Russia is dependent on large revenues received from its gas sales to the EU 
(Hedenskog, at al., 2002; Goldman, 2008). Therefore, if the EU imports less from Russia, 
Russia will lose a significant part of its revenue and energy geopolitics where the supplier 
has a gas weapon against its gas customers becomes more complex (Proedrou, 2007; 
Kropatcheva, 2011).  
To assess the type of integration in energy security, one needs to understand the economic 
objectives in the sphere. Therefore, it is important to understand the context in which the 
term occurs. It is because The Commission introduced the Third Energy Package of 
legislative proposal in 2007, and the additional concerns include efficiency, the socio-
economic dimension and energy infrastructure (Commission, 2007). The package entered in 
force in 2009 and legally The Third Energy Package consists of directives for gas and energy, 
gas pipeline property and utilisation and addresses the issues of unbundling (Directive 
2009/73/EC, Art.1; Art.9). The EU member states have different energy needs and diverging 
preferences in terms of energy consumption and these differences create a relative lack of 
unilateral energy policy (Muftuler-Bac & Baskan, 2011). Therefore, if one is to apply the 
intergovernmentalism theory (Moravscik, 1998; Moga, 2009) and further analyse EU energy 
policy with English School of international relations (Buzan, 2014), it can be argued that 
union level policy is only feasible if a convergence of energy interests among the member 
states arises. Thus, the energy security is only perceived collectively when an external threat 
emerges, in the case of gas security – Russia.  
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These dominance over gas infrastructure has allowed Russia to repeat the success of the 
Soviet Union to divide the EU into Eastern and Western markets, adjusting their energy 
diploŵaĐǇ aĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ. ‘ussia͛s disagƌeeŵeŶt ǁith UkƌaiŶe iŶ ϮϬϬϲ aŶd ǁith Belaƌus iŶ 
2007, are examples of Russian ruthlessness to ignore insignificant Eastern clients in favour 
of more profitable Western European ones. Although the conflicts did not have any 
sufficient practical impact on gas demand, it had however seriously undermined confidence 
iŶ ‘ussia. The Đleaƌest adŵissioŶ of the Ŷegatiǀe iŵage iŶ the West ǁas PƌesideŶt PutiŶ͛s 
atteŵpt to ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the teƌŵiŶologǇ ͚‘ussia – eŶeƌgǇ supeƌpoǁeƌ͛ aƌguiŶg that its 
use was counterproductive as it had too many connotations with the USSR (Valdai 
Discussion Club 2006). The EU has learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict not only that it 
needs to diversify transit routes but also its sources of supply (Von Liechtenstein, 2007). The 
Thiƌd EŶeƌgǇ PaĐkage ǁas a ƌespoŶse to ‘ussia͛s seaƌĐh of a gas containment policy given 
that Gazprom is actively looking for additional energy concessions from Central Asia, Middle 
East and Northern Africa (Socor, 2009). Alleged risks of gas dependence on Russia make the 
EU search for additional entry points and sources of supply from the same regions (Finon & 
Locatelli, 2008). The difficulty, however, of finding alternative suppliers is not limited to 
supplǇ aŶd tƌaŶsit pƌoďleŵs oŶlǇ. The EU͛s legal aŶd ĐoŶtƌaĐtual ƌelatioŶs ǁith gas supplieƌs 
rather than Russia remaiŶ uŶdeǀeloped ;Haghighi, ϮϬϬϳͿ. The EU͛s iŶteŶtioŶ to diǀeƌsifǇ its 
gas suppliers is more than merely an economic issue and intersects with vital geopolitical 
concerns.   
It is iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt of eŶeƌgǇ ƌelatioŶs͛ ĐoŵpliĐatioŶs that the EU has ƌeĐogŶised TuƌkeǇ͛s 
potential value as a relatively secure and independent route for importing a non-Russian gas 
(Tekin & Walterova, 2007). In particular, the EU signed a non-governmental accord 
supporting Nabucco gas project which potentially can supply non-Russian gas for Europe 
and may transform gas power balance in the region. The former EU Energy Commissioner, 
AŶdƌis Pieďalgs, ǁho sigŶed the agƌeeŵeŶt oŶ the ďehalf of the EU, eŶdoƌsed it as ͚esseŶtial 
to Euƌope aŶd the EU͛s ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt gas supplǇ pƌojeĐt͛ ;“oĐor, 2006). The EU need for 
diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, is Ŷot shaƌed ďǇ ‘ussiaŶ eŶeƌgǇ iŶteƌests ǁhiĐh haǀe used selleƌ͛s 
market conditions to defend market shares in the region (Tekin & Williams, 2009). Gazprom 
has acted to strengthen their influence in other third party regions including Caspian Sea 
basin, where the diversified route to supply independent gas will lay. Russian strategy to 
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expend further afield into new extra-regional and global energy sectors suggest prudence 
regarding increasing EU reliance on Russian gas, even with respect to the volumes 
transported through independent routes. This far encirclement necessitates a more active 
EU effoƌt to eŶsuƌe TuƌkeǇ͛s Đapaďilities as gas tƌaŶsit ƌoute aŶd adǀaŶĐes the ĐolleĐtiǀe EU 
interest in diversification on a political level.  
The potential benefits of Turkey being an energy partner, however, poses a further question 
of its full integration within the EU. Historically, Turkey has been an associated partner from 
1963 (Euroactiv.com, 2005) and has been in negotiations for full membership ever since. 
While many have questioned the ethical logic of the EU enlargement to Eastern Europe, the 
dominant role of the geostrategic reasons, especially in energy security, remains undoubted 
(Moravic &Vachudova, 2003). Likeǁise, foƌǁaƌd ŵoǀeŵeŶt of TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship 
negotiations in 2005 finds its strongest explanation in the rational calculations of the EU 
(Tekin, 2005). Supporters have explicitly cited the advantages on energy security issues, and 
that the EU and Turkey share essential interests in security, economy and dialogue of 
civilisations (Rehn, 2007). However, there are uncertainties surrounding the eventual fate of 
the accession talk due to historical, cultural and religious differences. Andris Piebalgs (2007) 
made a statement underlining that cooperation in energy sphere has nothing to do with the 
EU accession and the project is merely a work together to realise mutual benefits. EU official 
documents naturally use guarded language in linking energy security issues to the Turkish 
accession while strongly emphasising the importance of meeting EU energy objectives (The 
EU Council, 2008).   
Therefore, the discussion makes amply clearly that EU cannot easily diversify its energy 
suppliers. Currently, the only key to diversification is a wider range of supplier from Middle 
East and independent means accessing gas supplies without crossing Russian territory. Thus, 
Turkish gas corridor is the only feasible mode of connecting greater diversity of suppliers to 
Europe via aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ƌoute. Hoǁeǀeƌ, tƌeatiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ aŶd ǁilliŶgŶess to 
serve as a transit country, is matter to be addressed within existing framework of 
ĐoopeƌatioŶ aŶd ŵight Ŷot ďe eŶough to eŶsuƌe EuƌopeaŶ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ due to Gazpƌoŵ͛s 
far encirclement market strategy in the region.  On the political level, the proposed energy 
networks, associated with Nabucco project involve the higher standardisation and 
integration of regulatory environments characteristic of political union. Thus, more serious 
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efforts of the EU to diversify supply risks require less ambivalence on the question of 
TuƌkeǇ͛s aĐĐessioŶ.   
Simultaneously, rapidly changing political scenarios have been challenging the EU internal 
capacities for joint foreign policy formation. This has led to ĐhalleŶgiŶg the EU ͚uŶifoƌŵitǇ 
ideal͛ aŶd the ŶotioŶ that the EU aĐts ǁith a uŶitǇ ;“Đhŵidt, ϮϬϬϵͿ. The fallaĐǇ iŶ uŶited 
action can be assessed by English School of international relations, although originally 
developed to theorise international system and relations among states, it can also be 
applied to the study of regional international societies, sub-regions and supranational 
cooperation and energy security. In the EU context it considers different actors and can be 
cross-sectorial in nature and embody thinking in several expert communities simultaneously 
(Loschel et al., 2010; Aalto & Korkmaz Temel, 2014). Thus, the EU does not act in a perfect 
harmonised manner, instead each Member State although shares the general concerns and 
the common political culture of the Union, they lack a single command of collective action 
(Bozhilova & Hashimoto, 2010). Herein lies the rational choice problem that is inherent to 
the EU-Russia energy dialogue. This rational choice is intrinsically result orientated (Elster, 
1989) and it assumes individual actors foreseeing the cost-benefit orientation. Such theory 
observations, therefore, lead to conventional hypothesis of the EU, namely the between Old 
and New Europe. In this framework, the Old Europe states are more experience in 
international high politics through the conduct of two wars and the respective relationship 
with the USSR.   
The early improvements in dialogues between Russia and the EU are slow in nature and are 
marked by deliberate deterioration in mutual confidence since 1990s. The main interlinking 
poiŶt that staŶds out ǁith ƌespeĐt to ‘ussiaŶ eŶeƌgǇ diploŵaĐǇ is ‘ussia͛s desiƌe to deǀelop 
bilateral relations with individual EU member states to advance its influence on the broader 
EU. Bilateral agreements therefore been sought with Germany, France and Italy among 
others. To maintain its image as a reliable gas supplier and to enhance its position as the 
main gas supplier to the EU, Russia has attempted to seek long term contracts and to 
improve infrastructure, such as Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines. The pipelines are 
ǀieǁed to ďe a thƌeat to the ͚Ŷeǁ͛ EU ŵeŵďeƌ states ƌefleĐts the top pƌioƌitǇ status ďeiŶg 
afforded to the EU gas market, particularly Germany and the United Kingdom (Medvedev, 
2ϬϬϱͿ. The pipeliŶe pƌojeĐts also Đƌeate a ͚ƋualitatiǀelǇ Ŷeǁ stage iŶ ĐoopeƌatioŶ ǁith 
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EuƌopeaŶ gas Đustoŵeƌs͛ ;Medǀedeǀ, ϮϬϬϱͿ siŶĐe theǇ ǁill eŶaďle to deliǀeƌ ‘ussiaŶ gas 
directly to Western European customers, thereby creating the possibility of greater increase 
of ‘ussia͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd politiĐal foothold iŶ Euƌope. Thus, ‘ussiaŶ seŶioƌ figuƌes iŶĐludiŶg 
President Putin and CEO of Gazprom Alexei Miller have repeatedly acknowledged the 
importance of retaining their commitments to meeting contractual obligation with the EU.  
The narratives of the gas geopolitical games help in understanding that not only commercial 
and economic interests of individual actors and conditions of the market, but also strong 
political motivations and international interdependence are behind the foreign policies 
puƌsued iŶ the gas seĐtoƌ. EǀeŶ though ‘ussia has a ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ a ͚gas ǁeapoŶ͛ to iŶflueŶĐe 
the EU, the practical ability of its use is severely constrained by the relationship dynamics 
between Russia and isolated EU regions. This process is primarily born out of a degree of 
reluctance of the EU as a united political legislative body to negotiate with Russia on equal 
footing. Indeed, the Ukrainian energy crisis resolution gives the impression that the EU 
treats Russia as its uŶeƋual eŶeƌgǇ paƌtŶeƌ ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides fuƌtheƌ iŵpetus the KƌeŵliŶ͛s 
ambition to regain previously lost strategic influence in its immediate vicinity. The policy is 
echoed by Soviet superpower status nostalgia and has gained salience during the post-
Yeltsin administrations. These internal and external economic and geopolitical narratives 
have become symbolic of the dynamic in EU-Russia energy diplomacy and especially in the 
realm of energy security negotiations. 
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Policy development case study one - Eastern Europe and the Baltic States  
When assessing the natural gas trade landscape in EE, it becomes apparent that the region 
is either completely or almost completely dependent on Russian gas. The 2013 annual 
consumption figures show that the Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland are 
over 80 per cent, and Poland is over 50 per cent reliant on Russian gas exports to satisfy 
their domestic needs (BMIResearch.com, 2014). The region also remains highly dependent 
on Soviet-era infrastructure of gas pipelines that are linked directly to Russia (Grigas, 2012). 
This depeŶdeŶĐǇ ŶatuƌallǇ alloǁs ‘ussia to ǀieǁ the ƌegioŶ as fiƌstlǇ aŶ aƌea of ͚pƌiǀileged 
iŶteƌest͛ aŶd seĐoŶdlǇ the KƌeŵliŶ iŶheƌeŶtlǇ assuŵes that the ƌegioŶ has a lesseƌ politiĐal 
value compared to the other European regions. These two main assumptions inform the 
way the Kremlin uses Gazprom to engage with the regional powers and to enforce energy 
and foreign policies. Both assumptions also encourage Russia to employ hard power 
coercive diplomatic tools to exercise its energy superpower supremacy and disregard 
regional autonomous energy policies. The dynamic of gas diplomacy in the region therefore 
becomes a management of political dependencies (Grygiel, 2009).  
Firstly, the former Soviet bloc that are now situated in the EE, like Ukraine, historically fall 
uŶdeƌ MosĐoǁ͛s ͚spheƌe of pƌiǀileged iŶteƌest͛. ‘ussia͛s ultiŵate loŶg-term goal is to restore 
some degree of control over the EE corridor and these objectives are clearly articulated by 
former President Medvedev in foreign policy principles in what is known as Medvedev 
Doctrine: 
 ͚Theƌe aƌe ƌegioŶs iŶ ǁhiĐh ‘ussia has pƌiǀileged iŶteƌests. These ƌegioŶs aƌe hoŵe to 
countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends 
and good neighbours. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and 
build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbours. These are the principles I will 
follow in carrying out our foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ͛ ;Medǀedev, 2008). 
Special historical relations inform the use of hard power strategies therefore aligning with 
‘ussia͛s Đapaďilities, the ŵaiŶ the ŵaiŶ set of foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ tools eŵploǇed ďǇ MosĐoǁ is 
the control over energy supplies and political subversion through gas diplomacy. In the case 
of the region the conceptual origin of the regional Russian hard power is based on 
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understanding of political power which is imposed in the economic terms. Russia secured its 
interests in the region when Gazprom acquired shares in number of gas companies – Eesti 
Gaas (Estonia), Latvijas Gaze (Latvia), Lietuvos Dujos (Lithuania) and Gasum Oy (Finland) 
(Gazprom, 2014b). The acquisition has created a powerful network of local gas interests 
which ties to the Kremlin and serves as a tool of ‘ussia͛s haƌd poǁeƌ diploŵaĐǇ. Theƌefoƌe, 
the ƌealisatioŶ of Gazpƌoŵ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŶteƌests is diƌeĐtlǇ liŶked to the pƌoďaďilitǇ of 
other elites adopting policies that allow it to achieve energy policy outcomes favourable to 
Moscow. Thus, these commercial ties also allow the Kremlin to influence major gas 
diversification projects such as BalticConnector, a gas pipeline that would connect Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia (Gasum.com, 2014). The gas pipeline would partially eliminate total 
Finnish depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ ‘ussiaŶ gas tƌaŶsŵissioŶ iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe aŶd fosteƌ the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s 
energy safety and market competition (Ministry of Employment and the Economy of 
Finland, 2014). The project however faces considerable difficulties due to Latvijas Gaze and 
Gasum Oy both being co-owned by Gazprom (Bugajski, 2008). This type of power projection 
of regional economic governance imposes on political outcomes and can be classed as 
͚hǇdƌoĐaƌďoŶ iŵpeƌialisŵ͛. The Kremlin is pursuing hydrocarbon imperialism by controlling 
supplies of natural gas as well as pipelines and increasingly downstream assets. Moscow 
thus holds leverage over its customer states which are vulnerable because of heavy 
dependency on natural gas (Grygiel, 2010).  
The economic dominance and execution of Gazpƌoŵ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŶteƌests iŶ the ƌegioŶ 
then can be transformed into the second tool used by Russia to maintain its influence 
westwards - political subversion. This includes an array of activities, from influencing policy 
outcomes to support for and corruption of local politicians who are favourable to Moscow. 
In many Eastern European countries, there is a widespread fear that the old network of 
former Soviet agents combined with new Russian energy supply business elites are working 
together to undermine the eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd politiĐal iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe of MosĐoǁ͛s old satellites. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the old Soviet energy import agreements were due 
for a renewal which for the first time posed a political and economic challenge for both 
sides as the regional geography had been changed and more independent players were 
brought to the table. Many of the contracts lost their privileged discounts which were 
aǁaƌded ďǇ the “oǀiet UŶioŶ oŶ aŶ ideologiĐal ďasis, ͚ďeĐause those ĐouŶtƌies ǁeƌe Ŷo 
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loŶgeƌ ͚ďƌotheƌ͛ CEE ĐouŶtƌies, so theƌe ǁas Ŷo ƌeasoŶ to giǀe theŵ disĐouŶts͛ ;ViduŶa, 
2014). The loss of ideological consensus and reestablishment of new geographical borders 
prompted an apparent shift in Russian treatment of the region. Simultaneously, the 
domestic political systems of the region are marred by political fragmentation, commercial 
weakness and ethnically mixed environments, making regional politics particularly 
vulnerable to Russian influence. 
Russia has already tried to influence EE policy regardiŶg the EU͛s Thiƌd EŶeƌgǇ PaĐkage. It is 
an energy security and diversification legislation package unfavourable to the Kremlin that is 
aimed at ownership unbundling (Directive 2009/73/EC). In the region, that means 
sepaƌatiŶg Gazpƌoŵ͛s oǁŶeƌship of gas distribution to the consumers from the ownership 
of gas transmission networks. Latvia and Estonia sought an exemption from the EU gas 
directive until 2014, which was available to them as the member states whose gas 
transmission system is not connected to the rest of the EU. Both states opted for the option 
of ITO (independent transmission operator) which was the most favourable to Gazprom. 
Latǀia͛s MiŶistƌǇ of EĐoŶoŵiĐs ĐoŵŵeŶted oŶ the deĐisioŶ ďǇ statiŶg that due to 
geographical size of the country, the unbundling strategy proposed within Third Package 
ǁould ƌesult iŶ ŵaƌket fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ aŶd ǁould Ŷot ďe iŶ the state͛s ŶatioŶal iŶteƌests. The 
decision was eminently guided by Latvijas Gaze and the biggest consumer of Russian gas - 
Latvenergo. The former played a sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌole iŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s eŶeƌgǇ poliĐǇ aŶd 
position on unbundling. Simultaneously, the Latvian government has an agreement with 
Latvijas Gaze giving the company exclusive rights to ensure gas supply and distribution until 
2017. Therefore, unbundling would have resulted in considerable costs for the government 
for breaking the contractual terms. As a result of the favourable outcome of policy 
negotiations, Gazprom announced in 2010 that it would lower the gas prices for Estonia and 
Latvia by ϭϱ peƌ ĐeŶt. This is iŶ liŶe ǁith ‘ussia͛s teŶdeŶĐǇ to aƌgue that Đoopeƌatiǀe 
relationships would result in benefits such as lower gas prices.  
On the contrary, Lithuania opted for a different approach and in 2010 a Lithuanian law 
proposed the separation of the partially state owned transmission business, Lietuvos Dujos, 
from the distribution business. Lithuania was reported to be planning to split Lietuvos Dujos 
into a transport and a trade component, while retaining full control over the trading 
company (Iskauskas, 2011). The decision rights then would shift to the Lithuanian state in 
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line with the Third Energy Package (Directive2009/73/EC, Art.14). Gazprom, Lietuvos Dujos 
aŶd Vladiŵiƌ PutiŶ tƌied to iŶflueŶĐe VilŶius͛s positioŶ oŶ oǁŶeƌship uŶďuŶdliŶg ďǇ indirect 
threats of higher energy prices, international arbitration, and media assaults.  
Another dimension of Russian gas diplomacy is its ability to influence the regional political 
agenda and narrow energy policy options to the governing elites. The linkages that Moscow 
has fostered between uncooperative policies and high energy prices have an element of 
persuading the relevant political actors that it would be dangerous to implement certain 
energy policies required in the national interest. The result is a form of a political self-
censorship. Baltic leftist parties, major business with ties in Russia and media outlets have 
bought into this view and lobby in favour of a closer relationship with Russia, arguing that 
closer cooperation would result in greater energy security.  
The thiƌd tool of ‘ussia͛s haƌd poǁeƌ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ is aggƌessiǀe gas diploŵaĐǇ. The oǀeƌall 
objective of this policy is the isolation of energy islands in the EE region by cutting out the 
need for transit states. The region is a corridor for Russian gas supply to Western Europe. 
The Yamal-Europe and Brotherhood (Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod) pipelines are routed 
through Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland (Appendix 1) and supply gas to Germany, 
Austria and Italy. Its capacity is 100 billioŶ ĐuďiĐ ŵetƌes peƌ Ǉeaƌ, ǁhiĐh ŵakes it͛s the 
biggest on-land gas transit route in Europe (Gazpromexport, 2014). The Yamal-Europe 
supplies to its full capacity 32 billion cubic metres of gas annually (Gazprom, 2014c). The 
Russian state has a firm hand over the Russian natural gas sector allowing Gazprom a 
monopoly on gas transportation and exports. In addition to this type of resource 
consolidation within the Russian Federation borders, the Kremlin has also challenged all 
unwelcome interventions in Russia͛s spheƌe of diƌeĐt iŶflueŶĐe – the former Western Soviet 
Republics and the Warsaw Pact members. The risks of gas price hikes and cut-offs provides 
Moscow significant geo-economic and geopolitical leverage, which it would not shy from 
using against uncooperative consumers (Bryza & Touhy, 2013).  Thus, to successfully 
implement hard power foreign policy strategies, the supplier country must not only control 
the energy resources and their transit, but also intend to convert their power into political 
gain. 
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The perpetuation of energy islands like currently exists among the Baltic States, poses a 
threat not just to the energy security of the region but also to their national security 
(Leppiman et al 2013). Of the Baltic States only Lithuania serves as a gas transit state for 
Russian gas to Kaliningrad Oblast, which is physically separated from the Russian mainland 
by Belarus and Lithuania. Although, Russia has never de facto cut off gas supplies to the 
Baltic States, this transit route served as a guarantee of supply to Lithuania. Vilnius used this 
as a bargaining chip when negating with Moscow on several occasions in the 1990s. 
However, during the 2000s Moscow embarked on a strategy of breaking this reliance by 
planning to build storage facilities which would be connected to the Nord Stream and 
therefore completely bypass the Baltic States.  
The significant milestone of Russian and the CEE relations is the opening of the Nord Stream 
(Severny Potok) the first offshore pipeline that connects the Russian city of Vyborg to 
German city of Greifswald, passing through the Baltic Sea. The agreement officially was 
struck in 1997 between Russian Gazprom officials and the Finnish energy company Neste 
(Gazprom, 2014d). The pipeline was officially inaugurated in November 2011 and October 
2012 (Dome Projection, 2012). The first branch of the pipeline carried 27.5 billion cubic 
metres of gas. The question of what drives the Russian Nord Stream project is a complex 
one. Like any other energy exporter, Russia must make both economic and political 
considerations. 
The choice of the Nord Stream project over any other alternative proposed by the Baltic 
States and Poland is an excellent device to affect the domestic political decisions of those 
countries. Since the Russian government still has political interests in the EE region, in the 
analysis of Nord Stream, a political perspective should not be overlooked. While there has 
been no suggestion that the Kremlin has any desire to directly pressure EE countries on the 
subject, it is worth remembering that the Kremlin retains the political upper hand due to the 
common history and history of gas commercial trade in the region. To a very great extent, 
Russian policy objectives up to the start of the Nord Stream project could be said to be 
mostly the work of direct political and economic pressure.  
From an economic perspective the implementation of Nord Stream to its full capacity had 
gone ahead with much criticism and concerns from littoral states and actors that do not 
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accept the arguments of the pƌojeĐt͛s utilitǇ. The pƌojeĐt͛s pƌiĐe tag had ƌiseŶ fƌoŵ aŶ iŶitial 
4 billion euros in 2005 to 7.4 billion euros in 2008 and reach as high as 12 billion euros in 
2012 (Whist, 2008) due to the increase in steel prices (OECD, 2009), operational costs, 
environmental requirements and seabed preparation (Art 9, Espoo Convention, 1991). The 
almost doubling in price and the prospect of a future price increases, has made critics 
question why an alternative onshore solution, which may have been considerably cheaper 
has not been considered. 
The initial debates against the Nord Stream in the European Parliament were dominated by 
the representatives of the CEE region. The initial positions of the Baltic and Polish MEPs 
were set out in vigorous debates and petition papers which had been submitted to the 
Petition Committee since 2006. Although, none of the MEPs were outright opposed to the 
project itself, Lithuanian and Polish officials stated a preference that the new pipeline to be 
built on-shore through the traditional EU transit countries.  
͚Noƌd “tƌeaŵ ǁill isolate PolaŶd, the BaltiĐ “tates aŶd UkƌaiŶe […] if ‘ussia is goiŶg to push 
forward economically unviable and environmentally questionable projects, because they 
serve its foreign policy aims, then it should Ŷot ďe at ouƌ eǆpeŶse͛ ;GaĐek, Polish MEP ϮϬϬϴͿ. 
͚AŶotheƌ issue is the Đost of ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh is seǀeƌal tiŵes ŵoƌe thaŶ if Noƌd “tƌeaŵ 
built the pipeline overland. It would be the population of Germany and Europe that would 
have to pay for these additional costs, as the costs of construction would be added to the 
pƌiĐe of eǀeƌǇ ĐuďiĐ ŵetƌe of gas sold͛ ;‘utoǁiĐz, Polish MEP, ϮϬϬϴ Ϳ.  
A call for an alternative pipeline can be also found in the official documents of Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. There are mainly two alternatives that have been proposed in 
this regard – the Yamal 2 and Amber pipelines, both of which would run along the Yamal-
Europe route (as shown in appendix 1). The Yamal-Europe gas line brings Russian gas to 
Germany through Belarus and Poland. Baltic commentators have claimed that the 
construction of Yamal 2 would be several times cheaper than Nord Stream simply because it 
is an onshore project and because the Yamal-Europe pipeline was initially constructed in 
such a way that it would be possible to add a sister pipeline at a later stage (MoE Poland, 
2007; SEPA, 2007; Umbach, 2007). Furthermore, in 2004 the Baltic States proposed another 
alternative, the Amber pipeline, which would bring Russian gas to Germany through Latvia 
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and Estonia. Amber financially would have been three times less expensive than the Nord 
Stream project and one would get all the benefits of energy security as it would not go 
through Ukraine and Belarus (Grabauskas, Lithuanian MEP, 2008).  
The Swedish delegates advocated for further analysis on the need and demand for a new 
gas route, including the financial evaluation and environmental impact of the off-shore 
pipeliŶe.   ͚No oŶe, Ŷot eǀeŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ, ĐaŶ ĐouŶt oŶ ŵoƌe gas fƌoŵ Gazpƌoŵ foƌ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs 
to come. Nord “tƌeaŵ is Ŷo solutioŶ.͛ ;Laǆ, FiŶŶish MEP ϮϬϬϵͿ.  
Likewise, the project was widely contested by the Baltic States as being environmentally 
dangerous for the shallow Baltic Sea. Lithuanian MEPs announced the need for 
environmental review before the Parliament vote could be cast. This may to some extent 
haǀe ďeeŶ pƌoŵpted ďǇ a petitioŶ fƌoŵ LithuaŶiaŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtalist gƌoup the ͚YouŶg 
CoŶseƌǀatiǀe League͛ oŶ ďehalf of the BaltiĐ goǀeƌŶŵeŶts that the EU should Ŷot ŵoǀe 
forward with the new pipeline until appropriate research was carried out, including 
completion of environmental impacts and economic/market studies versus cost benefit 
analysis (0614 /2007 ). Finland, initially positive towards the project have asked for further 
investigation from Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to consider any land line 
alternatives, declaring that it would be positive from the viewpoint of EU energy security 
policy and the development of the EU natural gas market to also take into account the 
financial interests of the other Baltic States in the form of alternative pipeline routing (MFA 
Finland, 2007). 
In February 2009 Nord Stream AG released a Nord Stream Espoo Report (Nord Stream AG, 
2009). The report concluded that the proposed Nord Stream pipeline would be likely to 
improve consumer state gas import flow and would likely improve partner country welfare 
by facilitating entry and creating a new energy channel that does not depend on transiting 
conditions. This study did not prove satisfactory for all interested parties. Estonian officials 
have submitted comments on the behalf of various environmentalist groups, criticising the 
environmental research that was carried out by Espoo Report Group. They argued that the 
project was not well researched and went against the policy decision of the EU Council and 
International Laws on maritime safeguarding. In 2009, Finnish media broke a story about 
48 
 
the suspected corruption among the senior officials of Espoo Report and proposed 
alternative research be carried out (Lipponnen, Finnish MEP, 2009).  
Overall though, there was clearly a degree of consensus among the EU parliamentarians 
that the new Nord Stream project should be pursued with caution, but there was a 
sigŶifiĐaŶt laĐk of ĐoŶseŶsus ďetǁeeŶ EE ĐouŶties͛ MEPs aŶd GeƌŵaŶ MEPs duƌing European 
Parliament debates, particularly on the question of the common security policy and the 
Noƌd “tƌeaŵ pƌojeĐt͛s plaĐe iŶ it ďeĐaŵe appaƌeŶt 
͚I agƌee ǁith the ƌappoƌteuƌ that it is sĐaŶdalous that a Đƌoss-border project of such a far-
reaching nature should be treated as a bilateral issue between Russia and Germany. 
PƌoteĐtioŶ of the BaltiĐ aŶd the populatioŶs of BaltiĐ ĐouŶtƌies should ďe oŶe of the EU͛s 
ŵaiŶ pƌioƌities͛ ;BielaŶ, Polish MEP, ϮϬϬϴͿ   
͚With ƌegaƌd to ouƌ depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ ‘ussia, I ƌegaƌd Russia, despite all its problems, as a 
partner. The ten-year EU-Russia Energy Dialogue will be taking place in November. The fact 
is that we are mutually dependent. Why is this? As the Russians are responsible for more 
than 50% of the financing for the Nord Stream pipeline, which involves an investment of 
more than EUR 4 billion, it is in their interests for the gas to flow through it, otherwise the 
investment would not be profitable for them (Oettinger, 2010). 
There were also some significant disagreements among the MEPs regarding some of the 
financial aspects of the project and the economic impact of the project on the EU economy. 
Despite these differences, the committee was able to produce a comprehensive set of 
recommendations on how the progress should have moved forward, naming Nord Stream a 
strategic project under Trans-European energy regulations TEN-E (H-0231/07, 2007). It is 
difficult to get a clear picture on how the process unfolded, since not all the committee 
discussions are publicly documented. However, a speech of the EU Parliament President is 
available answering a question from a Polish MEP about the role of the Nord Stream project 
and the official stance of the EU on the project importance.  
͚The faĐt that Noƌd “tƌeaŵ is to ďe aŶ uŶdeƌǁater pipeline (that being the version of the 
project included in the guidelines for trans-European energy networks adopted by the 
CouŶĐil aŶd PaƌliaŵeŶtͿ is iŵŵateƌial heƌe […] the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s poliĐǇ is to pƌoŵote the 
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Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E), and that is why has just adopted a Plan for 
Priority Interconnections (PPI) involving some pipelines, including Nord Stream, that has 
ďeeŶ ideŶtified as stƌategiĐallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt foƌ ŵeetiŶg the UŶioŶ͛s gas Ŷeeds.͛ ;H-057 5/07, 
2007). 
The extent to which the recommendations of the White Paper matched up with the initial 
discussion carried out by MEPs demonstrates that the bottom up policy decision was made 
to accommodate the wishes of the biggest client countries and the Nord Stream AG and 
Gazprom lobby. This was also confirmed by Neumann (2007) who believes that the draft of 
the decision and final decision of the committee was majorly influenced by the Russian 
lobby and commercial interests of German clients. Official sources from Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland confirmed that the project, although voted to be an EU energy security issue, 
ultimately became bilateral German-Russian project.  
͚AustƌiaŶ, GeƌŵaŶ aŶd ItaliaŶ eŶeƌgǇ fiƌŵs aƌe doiŶg ďusiŶess ǁith the KƌeŵliŶ oŶ a ďilateƌal 
basis. This leads directly to political pressure by Moscow on individual Member States. 
GeƌŵaŶǇ is ďuildiŶg a gas pipeliŶe aloŶg the flooƌ of the BaltiĐ “ea iŶ oƌdeƌ to aǀoid PolaŶd͛ 
(Bielan, Polish MEP, 2009) 
͚The ďilateƌal agƌeeŵeŶts of soŵe Meŵďeƌ “tates, iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg pƌojeĐts suĐh as ͚Noƌd 
“tƌeaŵ͛, Đauses distƌust Ŷot just oǀeƌ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal issues, ďut also pƌiŶĐiples of solidaƌitǇ, 
aŶd theƌefoƌe theƌe ŵust ďe tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ iŶ this aƌea͛ ;MoƌkuŶaite-Mikuleniene, Lithuanian 
MEP, 2010).   
The examination of the Nord Stream reports and further examination of expert papers and 
public opinion suggests that most of the project negotiations and recommendations were 
agreed upon only between Gazprom and associated German partners. It therefore remains 
questionable just how far the policy on a new gas transport route was representative of the 
EU consensus or was the product a bottom-up policy development process. Latvian Prime 
Minister Valdis Dombrovskis expressed his concern over EU consensus stating that the 
project was not in line with the EU common energy policy objective (Reuters, 2009).  
Therefore, the petitions for discussion that were submitted in the beginning of the decision 
making process in 2006 are incompatible with all the final papers, and many of the 
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recommendations did not make it into the Final Report. To a very great extent, the 
policymaking process had been removed from the direct control of the EE states, and in 
some areas, the subsequent evolution of new energy security policy in the region has 
resulted in recommendations substantially different from or in opposition to the policy 
proposals put forward by the EE states at the earlier stages of the discussion. Ultimately, the 
Russian lobby succeeded in shifting the discussion of the utility of Nord Stream from the EE 
energy security concerns to EU economic benefits. This demonstrated that the Kremlin still 
ƌegaƌds the ƌegioŶ as the ͚zoŶe of pƌiǀileged iŶteƌest͛ ;Gƌigas, ϮϬϭϮͿ. The pƌoĐess thus 
demonstrated a successful soft power negotiation by dividing Europe into interest groups, 
fullǇ aǁaƌe that EE ƌegioŶ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to iŶflueŶĐe the EU eŶeƌgǇ poliĐǇ is liŵited Đoŵpaƌed 
to the influence of German representatives when economic benefits are concerned. The 
area of disagreement among the EU member states was the issue of the methods the 
Kremlin uses to bypass EE countries when negotiating Nord Stream contract terms. 
͚The KƌeŵliŶ is usiŶg eŶeƌgǇ supplies as a politiĐal iŶstƌuŵeŶt iŶ ĐoŶjuŶĐtioŶ ǁith the 
pƌiŶĐiple of ͚diǀide aŶd ƌule͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to Đoƌƌupt Euƌope country by country, from Cyprus to 
the NetheƌlaŶds. This appƌoaĐh is pƌoǀiŶg ƌeŵaƌkaďlǇ suĐĐessful͛ ;BielaŶ, Polish MEP, ϮϬϬϵͿ. 
Due to the unfriendly nature of the Russian-Polish relations, the Kremlin is less reluctant to 
saĐƌifiĐe the ͚ƌeliaďle eǆpoƌteƌ͛ status iŶ the ƌegioŶ. IŶ “epteŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϰ Gazpƌoŵ ƌeduĐed 
natural gas supply to Poland by 20 per cent over two days (Charter & Hoyle, 2014). Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski, a former Polish prime minister commented stating that the cut off are a part of 
Russian aggression strategy to expand the empire (The Moscow Times, 2014). 
Furthermore, the more recent stages of  Post-Soviet relations, including the various 
irritation around the Nord Stream project, have not been removed from the direct control 
of the Kremlin and therefore, in some areas, the subsequent evolution of the new relations 
have resulted in recommendations from EE states that are in opposition to the official policy 
of the EU. As a result, some of the states have been critical of Russian intentions in the Baltic 
Sea. This group of states is championed by Lithuania and Poland – the two countries that 
suspect Russia in waging a new cold war against the EU. The region therefore actively seeks 
to shape a more critical EU line towards Russia. Motivated by Russian political and economic 
pressures and also unresolved historical grievances, the can be classified as the group of 
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͚the Ŷeǁ Đold ǁaƌƌioƌs͛.  The ŵiǆtuƌe of deteƌioƌated politiĐal ƌelatioŶs ǁith ‘ussia ofteŶ 
spill over into the economic field.    
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Policy development case study two – Central and Southern Europe  
Following on from the Nord Stream case study and Russian political behaviour in the EE 
region, this chapter will investigate an equally topical energy policy development in the 
central and Southern Europe and the Balkans. This is the biggest group of the EU countries 
that is spread through a vast amount of geographical Europe and includes Austria, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Belgium in the central European 
region. These middle sized and middle ranking states have little potential to really try to set 
the EU agenda, preferring to follow the mainstream policy which is mostly shaped by the 
western European region. While they are not active promoters of Russian interests within 
the EU legislative network, they tend to oppose actions that they fear might irritate 
MosĐoǁ. DuƌiŶg PƌesideŶt PutiŶ͛s offiĐial ǀisit to Austƌia he ǁas giǀeŶ a fƌieŶdlǇ ƌeŵiŶdeƌ ďǇ 
the hosts that Ukraine had been ruled by Vienna in 1914. The highly symbolic welcome was 
giǀeŶ ǁhile Gazpƌoŵ aŶd OMV, Austƌia͛s state ĐoŶtƌolled eŶeƌgǇ giaŶt, sigŶed a deal to 
build South Stream. This was a significant step in Russian-Austrian relations undermined the 
legitimacy of the ambitious EU centralised Project Nabucco pipeline which wold have 
ǁeakeŶed Gazpƌoŵ as Euƌope͛s ďiggest gas supplieƌ ;The Tiŵes, ϮϬϭϭͿ.  
The South Stream pipeline alike Nord Stream is an off-shore gas route through the Black Sea 
from the Russian coastal compression station at Beregovaya to the Bulgarian town of Varna. 
The project was first proposed in 2008 by a special purpose company, South Stream AG, 
registered in Switzerland and a definite project outline was published in 2011 by Gazprom 
(Gazpromexport, 2014). The commissioning of the first branch of the South Stream on-shore 
pipeline is scheduled for late 2015 and the scheduled commission of the second branch for 
Austria in late 2016 (Gazpromexport, 2014). As with Nord Stream, the South Stream pipeline 
provided a range of political power tools used, reflecting the role played and the relative 
degree of influence held by each of partners or partner groups over the final policy 
outcomes. Since the beginning of the South Stream development process, certain inherent 
problems have been repeatedly cited. The economic environment of the region is design of 
the competition of the two prospective gas pipelines – South Stream and Nabucco, 
organised respectively by a consortium of six gas mega-companies and a joint venture of 
Gazprom and Italian ENI. It is sufficiently clear that South Stream is driven by a unique 
53 
 
symbiosis between Gazprom and Kremlin, with Italian ENI and the former Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi involved in a supporting role (Utkin, 2010).  
It is an underlining assumption that unlike the Nord Stream, this project is not simply a 
classical geopolitical competition with an energy twist, nor a straight forward economic 
completion for profits from gaining access to the European Southern gas corridor. There are 
strong economic incentives ďehiŶd “outh “tƌeaŵ, hoǁeǀeƌ, the KƌeŵliŶ͛s ŵateƌial iŶteƌests 
tƌaŶslate iŶto aďuŶdaŶt ͚Gƌeat Gaŵe͛ ;Baeǀ & OǀeƌlaŶd, ϮϬϭϬͿ. The poǁeƌful politiĐal 
drivers that have propelled the ambitious enterprise through the uncertainties of the 
financial crisis are related to the intangible motivations related to Russian prestige and 
ĐƌediďilitǇ. Fƌoŵ the ŵoŵeŶt the fiƌst “outh “tƌeaŵ ĐoŶtƌaĐt ǁas sigŶed, ‘ussia͛s iŶteŶtioŶ 
to ďuild the pipeliŶe ǁas laďelled as the Ŷeǁest episode of the ͚Gƌeat Gaŵe͛. Populaƌ as 
these political interpretations are in the media and public opinion polls, there is an inherent 
oversimplification of the assumptions of power balances and clashing interests of the 
competing state actors.  
The popular portrayal of Russia as a revisionist power has certainly gained political validity 
after episodes of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014, which 
delivered a profound shock to the European security systems even if they failed to make 
serious impact on energy markets. Hoǁeǀeƌ, a Đloseƌ look at the ‘ussiaŶ ͚pƌedatoƌ͛ ƌeǀeals 
that ‘ussia͛s pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ ďuildiŶg aŶ offshoƌe leg of “outh “tƌeaŵ aŶd eliŵiŶatiŶg tƌaŶsit 
dependency is hardly an evil plot aimed to subject particular producers and consumers. It is 
also a hardly plausible assumption that the Kremlin aims to establish dominance over the 
Southern European energy market as Gazprom is planning only a limited increase of gas 
deliveries to the region, many states in which have solvency issues (IMF, 2014).  
 
This is due to the vast amount of the region still partially dependent on the Russian gas 
supply and Russian gas infrastructure. They also take full advantage of the opportunities 
presented by the Russian economic growth. The other half – Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Hungary – hope to become gas hubs for Gazprom in the EU. In 2014 before the South 
Stream project became obsolete, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania were the biggest 
beneficiaries of the transit pipeline. It prompted Hungary and Bulgaria to make efforts to 
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enable the construction of South Stream by attempting to draft laws as a means of 
circumventing EU Third Energy Package rules. These laws in many ways were drafted by 
Gazprom officials and they undermine the unity and the values of the EU (Forbrig, 2014).  
Arguably, however, what matters is not the objective of power or the ability to project it but 
the perception of the patterns of interactions that are prevalent among the political elites of 
the states involved in these interactions. This perspective also allows us to view the role of 
the EU in South Stream project negotiations, and as a political actor in its own right, and it is 
far less inclined to adopt a geopolitical perspective on bilateral energy relationships with 
Russia. In early discussion regarding development of a gas route directly to Southern 
Europe, there had been some debate as to whether energy supply security and 
diversification under Common EU Energy Security Policy should be undermined by 
construction of another direct pipeline from Russia.  
͚“outh “tƌeaŵ goes agaiŶst the pƌiŶĐiple of eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ iŶ Euƌope, ďased oŶ diǀeƌse 
sources and routes. Thus, if South Stream does go ahead, it should not receive EU funding at 
aŶǇ stage͛ ;GaĐek, Polish MEP, ϮϬϬϴͿ.   
In contrast to the negotiations done by Gazprom and Kremlin on a bilateral level with transit 
countries, Russia lacked support from official Brussels on the South Stream project. 
Therefore, Russia was forced to respond with drastic measures to the Third Package on the 
authoritative level. Russia officially send a request for consultation (WTO 14-2748, 2014) to 
ĐhalleŶge the pƌoǀisioŶs of the ͚Thiƌd EŶeƌgǇ PaĐkage͛ that aƌe iŶĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith a Ŷuŵďeƌ 
of obligations and specific commitments of the EU and its member states under the WTO 
agreements (WT/DS476/1, 2014). Russian Prime mister Dmitry Medvedev commented on 
the possiďle laǁsuit ǁith the EU oǀeƌ the uŶďuŶdliŶg ƌule iŶ the ͚Thiƌd PaĐkage͛ uŶdeƌliŶiŶg 
that it is inconsistent with existing ties and means a rejection of existing contracts between 
Gazprom and transit countries (Medvedev, 2014).  
Consequently, the Russian government on the behalf of Gazprom and South Stream AG 
initiated a lawsuit against the EU and its member states for violation of international trading 
standards under AƌtiĐle I ǁheƌe supplǇ of tƌade seƌǀiĐes is defiŶed as ͚ďǇ a seƌǀiĐe supplǇ of 
oŶe ŵeŵďeƌ thƌough ĐoŵŵeƌĐial pƌeseŶĐe of aŶǇ otheƌ ŵeŵďeƌ͛ ;GATT, ϭϵϵϰͿ aŶd AƌtiĐle 
IV which stipulates that the participation of developing countries in world trade shall be 
55 
 
faĐilitated thƌough ͚the liďeƌalisatioŶ of ŵaƌket aĐĐess iŶ seĐtoƌs aŶd ŵodes of supplǇ of 
eǆpoƌt iŶteƌest to theŵ͛ ;GATT, ϭϵϵϰͿ. ‘ussiaŶ DeputǇ MiŶisteƌ of EĐoŶoŵiĐ DeǀelopŵeŶt 
Alexei Likhachev in his press release also pointed out that Russia is planning to start 
investigation within the WTO framework under Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidises 
and Countervailing Measures (ITAR-TASS, 2014). Article 3 refers to the prohibition of 
͚suďsidies ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt, ǁhetheƌ solelǇ oƌ as oŶe of seǀeƌal otheƌ ĐoŶditioŶs, upon the use of 
doŵestiĐ oǀeƌ iŵpoƌted goods͛ ;WTO, ϮϬϬϭͿ. Theƌefoƌe, the ŵeasuƌes that aƌe Đited iŶ the 
Third Energy Package appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to Gazprom and the 
Kremlin directly by denying a sphere of political influence or indirectly by diminishing profits 
under the agreement in place. 
Apart from the commercially and politically damaging Third Package, the Nabucco pipeline 
is direct competition to the South Stream project.  Nabucco has a camp of supporters, 
among them EU states including Poland and the Czech Republic that are known for their 
distinctly hostile view of Russia. However, the most crucial element for this club is the 
ǁilliŶgŶess of the CoŵŵissioŶ to ƌeĐogŶise the NaďuĐĐo pipeliŶe as a ͚flag pƌojeĐt͛ to 
protect EU energy supply diversification efforts and the security of supply (Piebalgs, 2008). 
It ǁas duƌiŶg ‘ussia͛s ĐhaiƌŵaŶship of the Gϴ “uŵŵit iŶ ϮϬϬϲ that the topiĐ of eŶeƌgǇ 
security, particularly within the EU, came to the forefront of the debate. Every proposition 
in the energy security agenda, goes against the vision adopted by the Commission, however 
the decisive cut reveals that the common core elements are: diversification, liberalisation 
and degasification. 
Diversification is the policy that is directly aimed at reducing EU gas dependence on 
Gazprom services. It was recognised early on that South Stream could be potentially used by 
the Russian government as political leverage to control European Union behaviour. Finding 
some means to deal with the issue has been one of the key EU policy concerns surrounding 
South Stream from the start of the process. The main concern was raised around the 
unilateral ownership of the pipe route by the supplier company which is addressed in the EU 
Third Energy Package. Thus, the specification in the Third Package could be made to appear 
to be an EU hard power tactic against the interests of Gazprom and subsequently the 
KƌeŵliŶ͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ goals. This pheŶoŵeŶoŶ poteŶtiallǇ opeŶs a Ŷeǁ disĐussioŶ of the 
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energy weapon that is used ďǇ Bƌussels͛s ƌatheƌ thaŶ ‘ussiaŶ offiĐials. This also suggests 
that there are implications in trading standards, when Gazprom is forced to find a 
commercial and lobbying solution surrounding the issue from the start of the South Stream 
project implementation.  
The political difficulties arise from insufficient energy policy cooperation in the region and 
between the new South Stream transit countries. For example, if one is to look at Appendix 
3, the South Stream route is mapped through the non-EU state of Serbia. This problem is 
particularly difficult with regards to communication of the Third Package restrictions as 
Serbian companies and officials are not bound by the restrictions and could use domestic 
legislation and international legislation under WTO standards over the EU official 
suggestions. The enforcement of the Third Energy Package is also difficult because of the 
bilateral relations Russia possess in the region, especially with non- EU member states. 
Serbia is the key actor in the Russian soft power strategy, as it is the only state on the route 
of South Stream that is not a member state but a candidate state for the EU enlargement in 
the Western Balkan region (Europa.eu, 2014). In December 2013 Slobodan Sokolovic, 
Secretary General at the National Petroleum Committee in Serbia commented on the EU 
Third Energy package application to Serbian gas market stating that although Serbia is 
obliged to implement provisions of the EU energy package in the internal market, South 
Stream is exempt from the legislation due to Serbia being a minority shareholder of the gas 
interconnection (InSerbia, 2013). The majority shares are owned by Gazprom and it is also 
singlehandedly the biggest investor in the regional development of the route (Bajatovic, 
2014), the rest of the shares are owned by French, German and Italian companies 
respectively (Gazpromexport.ru, 2014).  The exemption was also confirmed by Gunther 
Oettinger, EU Energy Commissioner, stating that: 
͚“eƌďia, aŶ EU ĐaŶdidate ĐouŶtƌǇ, is Ŷot ďouŶd by the same rules as EU members, and 
therefore the EU executive power has no grounds to demand the suspension of the 
ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ͛ ;ITA‘-TASS, 2014).   
The bilateral deals between Russia and Southern European EU members is an example of 
Russian willingness to negotiate energy deals directly with transit countries as it advances 
their foreign policy aim of becoming the exclusive energy supplier in the region. With 
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regards to policy communication, there are political identity sensitivities regarding their 
recognition. Such issues have been among the energy policy challenges that have 
encouraged Gazprom to pursue its goals through soft power strategies. Firstly, although the 
Third Package is a sound economic policy in terms of liberalisation of the energy market, the 
position of Gazprom in the EU market is largely based on business alliances with European 
gas giants of Gaz de France (France) and E.ON (Germany). The beneficial relationship 
Gazprom is enjoying with German, French and Italian gas companies includes engagement 
in asset share swap in order for European companies to secure access to supply sources in 
Siberia for example the deal between Gazprom and E.ON on the asset swaps as part of 
Yuzhno-Russkoye field development project (Gazprom, 2009). The problem with this policy 
therefore is that it is directly against the interests of these companies as it prohibits the 
ownership of gas infrastructure either by producer or supplier (Kommersant, 2010), which 
are able to mobilise support from their parent states as was apparent in the case of direct 
German interest in the Nord Stream project. The biggest lobby on the behalf of the 
European company interests is the Magritte Group comprised of the CEOs of companies like 
Italian ENI, Austrian OMV and German E.ON, all of which have investments in the South 
Stream project (Margritte Group, 2014) and in total comprise 12 utility companies 
ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg half of the Euƌope͛s energy market. They critique multiple targets in the EU 
energy guidelines:  
͚While a doĐuŵeŶt of this diŵeŶsioŶ aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶĐe foƌ the futuƌe of Euƌope͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ 
requires full and considered study, an initial conclusion of the Magritte Group of CEOs is 
that the setting of multiple targets does not support a technology neutral approach, nor 
does it allow a Đost effiĐieŶt ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďetǁeeŶ loǁ ĐaƌďoŶ teĐhŶologies͛ ;GDF “uez, 
2014).  
At the same time Christian Drepper, spokesperson for E.ON disagreed with the principles on 
unbundling stipulated in the Third Energy Package that the new norms will not lead to lower 
prices (Bloomberg, 2007) and that the Third Package will discourage the competition 
(Euractiv, 2007). The influence of the Russian lobby should not be underestimated, but the 
EU CoŵŵissioŶ is ƌeluĐtaŶt to leaǀe the ͚“outheƌŶ Coƌƌidoƌ͛ iŶ ‘ussiaŶ haŶds kŶoǁiŶg that 
“outh “tƌeaŵ is also dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ PutiŶ͛s peƌsoŶal aŵďitioŶ aŶd Gazpƌoŵ͛s iŶside tƌadiŶg 
practices, so that the costlier the project, the greater the inside profits made by investors.  
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͚The ƌappoƌteuƌ oŶ the BlaĐk “ea ƌegioŶal poliĐǇ ƌeŵiŶds us that the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ 
supports new energy infrastructure and viable transport corridors, diversifying both 
suppliers and routes. The prime example of such an undertaking is the Nabucco Gas 
PipeliŶe, alƌeadǇ ƌeĐogŶised as a pƌioƌitǇ pƌojeĐt of EuƌopeaŶ iŶteƌest͛ ;GaĐek, Polish MEP, 
2008).  
Therefore, in the case of the Southern European corridor Russia does not possess the option 
to persuade the European Commission of the absolute utility on South Stream as was in the 
case with the example of Nord Stream and potential gas supply disruptions transited 
through Ukraine and Belarus. It is precisely for this lack of leverage that Russia had to 
ĐhaŶge its stƌategǇ aŶd pƌessuƌe poiŶts, aŶd although Gazpƌoŵ͛s paƌtŶeƌ ĐoŵpaŶies ƌeŵaiŶ 
eƋuallǇ iŶǀested iŶ pƌojeĐt͛s suĐĐess, the EU CoŵŵissioŶ aŶd the EU PaƌliaŵeŶt ƌeŵaiŶ 
unwilling to accept Russian political ambition in exchange to commercial profits. 
The relations between Russia and Southern European nations are much warmer than the 
rest of the EU. Greece, Cyprus and Malta also act as pro-Russian lobbies in the EU. Bulgaria, 
Romania, Greece and Cyprus in the southern European region, therefore, can be classified 
as a ‘ussiaŶ ͚TƌojaŶ hoƌse͛ iŶ the EU. Eǆaŵples ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ theiƌ ǀeto aĐtiǀitǇ iŶ the EU 
Council over Russian sanctions. Fyodor Lukyanov (2015) comments that Russia is expecting 
the EU to be less homogeneous on the subject of economic sanctions and the Kremlin will 
make efforts to encourage some countries to be even more reluctant (The Times, 2015). At 
present European countries are divided over the extension of sanctions in June 2015; it is 
Ŷuƌtuƌed ďǇ the KƌeŵliŶ thƌough GƌeeĐe, HuŶgaƌǇ, CǇpƌus aŶd Malta͛s adǀoĐaĐǇ of the 
Russian case. The Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras stated that the sanctions against 
‘ussia aƌe ͚the ƌoad to Ŷoǁheƌe͛ ;The Tiŵes, ϮϬϭϱͿ. AŶ estiŵated ϲϯ peƌ ĐeŶt of Greeks see 
Russia in a positive light against 23 per cent who favours the EU (The Times, 2015).   
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Policy development case study three – Western Europe  
The western European region has the most influence on the common EU energy policies and 
is comprised by Germany, France, Spain and Italy, which is a member of this group due to its 
commercial interests rather than geographical criteria. Aside from Spain all have strong 
political and economic bilateral relationships with Russia. They have all been prized by 
President Putin and are shown the respect great powers owe each another. Support from 
these big states, particularly France and Germany, is crucial for lobbying any coherent EU 
policy that suits Russian foreign needs. Therefore, the approach of Russian gas diplomacy in 
the region is drastically different from the rest of the EU due to the understanding of mutual 
commercial benefit and balance of political powers.   
The main characteristic of Russian gas relations with Western Europe is the perspective of 
interdependence (Kratochvil & Tichy, 2013). This refers to the idea that integration is 
possible and desirable because of the complimentary interests of Russia and its Western 
partners. The integration discourse is rooted in the Constructivist perspective of IR and is 
supported by soft power theory. Internationalists therefore support the idea that EU-Russia 
gas relations have a special status that extends beyond a simple trade partner dialogue 
(Kratochvil &Tichy, 2013). Although the legal basis for such cooperation was the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement of 1997, the goal of the main EU Western member states to 
integrate their energy markets materialised in 2000 in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (Dickel 
& Westphal, 2012). Thus, despite the theoretical setbacks resulting from complex realities 
and even if considering the epistemological deadlock of the EU system, a pragmatic theory-
building can be suggested (Somers 1998; Friedrichs & Kratochvil, 2009) which highlights key 
negotiation components – consistent energy transportation preferences and utility 
maximisation (McDonald, 2003). Respectively, many factors motivate Russia to seek multi-
polarity, including aforementioned superpower nostalgia, the decline of the USA as an 
opportunity for market and utility maximisation (Ambrosio, 2005; Bozhilova &Hashimoto, 
2010). The utility maximisation is therefore linked with Russian soft power objectives where 
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‘ussiaŶ aŶd Gazpƌoŵ͛s aĐtioŶs ƌeaĐh ďeǇoŶd ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŶteƌest to state͛s pƌestige aŶd 
reputation and satisfaction (Oliver & Sanderson, 1985).   
The idea of integration clearly dominates Russian regional gas diplomacy (Aalto & Kormaz 
Temel, 2012; Kratochvil & Tichy, 2013). The Russian version of this discourse presumes that 
there is a symmetrical interdependence between both actors which necessitates 
iŶtegƌatioŶ. EŶeƌgǇ iŶteƌdepeŶdeŶĐe is ͚a ĐeŵeŶtiŶg faĐtoƌ of the estaďlished ƌelatioŶs aŶd 
the faĐtoƌ ought to ďe ƌegaƌded as a thiŶg of positiǀe ǀalue aŶd Ŷot a thƌeat͛ ;Laǀƌoǀ, ϮϬϬϳͿ. 
The proper course of action, according to this discourse, is a negotiated process in which 
both actors contribute equally (Kratochvil & Tichy, 2013). Hence, the greater Russian long 
term policy objectives the more accurate and rational its actions will be. In the case of 
WesterŶ Euƌope, ‘ussia is iŶĐliŶed to aĐt as a ͚fƌieŶd͛ aŶd this fƌieŶdship eŶaďles the logiĐ of 
self-iŶteƌest ǁhiĐh theŶ is eǆteŶded to the iŶteƌests of those the KƌeŵliŶ ĐoŶsideƌs ͚fƌieŶds͛ 
;Digeseƌ, ϮϬϬϵͿ. The ‘ussiaŶ ͚fƌieŶd stƌategǇ͛ is ďased oŶ gƌeat poǁeƌ management within 
the EU. It concerns the interaction of large member states and the EU major energy powers 
within the limits of the EU competence division. Notably, in the case of the natural gas, the 
EU lacks great power status. Only Germany, France, Italy and UK attract neighbouring power 
recognition (Bilgin, 2011) and this fragmentation further explains why common EU 
legislation process remains limited to a co-operative type in the external gas trade. The 
illuminating example of Russian lobbying of the EU through the regional governments is the 
oďstƌuĐtioŶ of the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s plaŶs foƌ eŶeƌgǇ liďeƌalisatioŶ iŶ ϮϬϬϳ.  
 Although, Russia can be such a power for the wider European society, the EU is 
characterised by the abundance of powerful energy companies forming a part of the energy 
security calculations (Aalto & Kormaz Temel, 2012). The great power management raises 
the status of the larger member states as formal institutions. Thus, the objective of the 
Kremlin to influence the EU energy security policy-making process is achieved by 
fragmenting the Union (Romanova, 2012). The narrow merit that the Russo-European 
natural gas dialogue has is that Kremlin and Gazprom representatives have an official forum 
to directly negotiate with strategic partner states (Aalto & Korkmaz Temel, 2012). For 
example, German-Russian energy diplomacy led by Chancellor Schroder and President Putin 
facilitated the implementation of the Nord Stream project which enables direct supplies of 
natural gas from Russia to Germany reducing transit risks in Belarus, Ukraine and the CEE 
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region. The interlink of the geopolitical, economic interests and normative limitations 
allowed Russia to turn the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict of the mid-2000s into a driving 
force to strengthening individual state sense of sovereignty (Natorski & Surralles, 2008). 
Subsequently, the pipeline projects implemented after this conflict were a direct result of 
the intensified security logic and soft power lobbying in strategic partner state governments 
(Kirchner & Berk, 2010.) The two major examples of this process are the Nord Stream and 
the South Stream project implementation procedures. Both were predominantly negotiated 
upon with Germany and France as their respective priority projects. That the spokeswoman 
for ALDE group voiced collective CEE block opinion by stating that:  
͚‘ussia is fƌagŵeŶtiŶg the solidaƌitǇ of EU ŵeŵďeƌ states ďǇ offeƌiŶg ďilateƌal eŶeƌgǇ supplǇ 
projects which may be exploited for political purposes with sad consequences for the 
common EU energy policy (Budreikaite, Lithuanian MEP, 2007).   
The Russian approach to negotiating with the Western European region therefore is 
ideŶtified as ͚stƌategiĐ paƌtŶeƌship͛ ;LeoŶaƌd & PopesĐu, ϮϬϬϳͿ ǁheƌe keǇ EU ŵeŵďeƌ states 
enjoy a special relationship with Russia and are willing to undermine the common EU 
policies.  
Russia has also attempted to maintain its image as a reliable supplier to the western 
Đustoŵeƌs aŶd iŶdeed tƌies to eŶshƌiŶe its ƌole as the EU͛s ŵaiŶ gas supplieƌ thƌough 
seeking long term contracts and improving infrastructure links with them, such as the Nord 
Stream pipeline. This route although viewed as a threat by the EE region, reflects top 
priority being afforded in the EU common market, particularly Germany and UK (Medvedev, 
2005). The project creates an unprecedented qualitatively new stage of cooperation with 
Western European gas customers (Monaghan, 2007), since it is now making direct deliveries 
to western customers and therefore increasing political and economic integration between 
Russia and strategic partner states. Senior Russian figures including President Putin and 
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller have repeatedly underlined the importance of the EU market 
and reiterated their commitment to meeting contractual obligations. When Gazprom 
managed to avoid economic sanctions imposed on Russia, including the state owned oil 
monopoly Rosneft, over the conflict in Ukraine. Rick Haythrnthwaite, the chair of British 
Centrica (2015) told The Times that whatever the United European interests are, its member 
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states need to be pragmatic about the realities of energy trade as it is unrealistic that 
Russian gas will be replaced in the near-term (The Times, 2015).  
While Russian integration champions admit that Russia needs its revenues from the gas 
trade with Europe, they are divided on the question whether this dependence is 
sǇŵŵetƌiĐal. PutiŶ has also adŵitted that ͚‘ussia depeŶds eǀeŶ ŵoƌe oŶ the EuƌopeaŶ 
Đustoŵeƌ thaŶ theǇ depeŶd oŶ theiƌ supplieƌ͛ ;PutiŶ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. ‘espeĐtiǀelǇ, ϰϰ% of the EU͛s 
gas originates from Russia, while the EU market accounts for 67% of Russian gas exports. 
Therefore, the preference of the bilateral relationships in the region is also due to the fear 
of the asymmetrical negotiation partnership where Russia is considered to be the junior 
partner (Kratochvil & Tichy 2013). Where energy is concerned it is common in the post-
Soviet space for original economic questions to escalate into political disputes. Disputes 
related to energy between Russia and the EU have never escalated into politically motivated 
hostile action. However, the media attention to energy issues between Russia and the EU 
accelerated when Schroder and Putin signed the Northern gas pipeline bilateral deal in 
September 2005 (Aalto, 2012).  
The avoidance of multilateralism in negotiations is in the form of action and reaction or the 
lack thereof (Bozhilova & Hashimoto, 2010; de Montbrial, 2002) and aligns with the 
defensive realism theory and hard power theory as a mechanism to counteract and 
preserve national and Gazprom interests (Waltz, 1979). The sense of weakness is visible in 
the stƌategiĐ ŶatioŶal iŶteƌest ͚to Đƌeate eǆpoƌt ƌoutes that aƌe ĐoŵpletelǇ iŶdepeŶdeŶt of 
the adjaĐeŶt ĐouŶtƌies͛ ;VeiŶshtok, CEO of TƌaŶsŶeft, ϮϬϬϲͿ. This illustƌates that ‘ussia is 
concerned of being vulnerable to the external pressures including transit fees and route 
diversification (Monaghan, 2007).  The feelings are particularly acute where the Third 
Energy Package legislation is concerned. France and Germany in particular forced 
compromises in the ownership unbundling part of the legislation (Talus, 2012) due to the 
former state monopolies German E.ON and RWE and French EDF and GDF lobbying of their 
states to retain ownership of the gas and electricity systems if supervised and managed by 
an independent operator (Euroactiv, 2009). However, vis-à-vis Russian supplies, Germany, 
FƌaŶĐe oƌ ItalǇ Ŷeǀeƌ ĐhalleŶged the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s aŶtitƌust iŶƋuiƌǇ iŶ ϮϬϭϮ oŶ Gazpƌoŵ͛s 
possible anti-competitive behaviour related to gas market partitioning and supply 
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diversification (Kanter, 2012) and antitrust charges in 2015 over gas market dominance 
abuse (Kanter, 2015).  
The avoidance of multilateralism therefore is a reflection of a hard power dynamic where 
Russia seeks to gain leverage over weaker counterparts (Guzman, 1998) by negotiating 
energy policies by isolating partners. Russia considers itself troubled by the limited access 
that Gazpƌoŵ has to ĐlieŶts͛ iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌkets. It also feels ďloĐked ďǇ the EU͛s politiĐal 
barriers to liberation, based on the fears of economic overdependence on Russia (see 
EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s Thiƌd EŶeƌgǇ PaĐkage oŶ uŶďuŶdliŶg laǁs, ϮϬϬϵͿ. Theƌefoƌe, MosĐoǁ 
ǁould like to ďƌoadeŶ the ĐoopeƌatioŶ iŶ the eŶeƌgǇ field ͚to ďe Ŷot oŶlǇ ŵutuallǇ 
beneficial, but also based oŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ appƌoaĐhes aŶd pƌiŶĐiples͛ ;KhƌisteŶko, ϮϬϬϱͿ suĐh as 
͚the pƌediĐtaďilitǇ aŶd staďilitǇ of eŶeƌgǇ ŵaƌkets͛ ;PutiŶ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. The ŵassiǀe iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of 
the gas exports to the EU for Russian internal stability and the alternatives that are 
increasingly aǀailaďle foƌ the EU, MosĐoǁ͛s depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ the ďilateƌal gas tƌade Đould 
soon outweigh that of the EU. The described conflict of norms and policy objectives brings 
one to the discourse of diversification (Belyi, 2013). A fine illustration of this is the 
termination of the South Stream project in Southern European corridor.   
The importance of realising profit interests in the region as a result of an efficient gas 
diplomacy and secured supply of Russian energy is very significant for the Russian state. It is 
even more highlighted in Western European region where Russian profit interests come 
before geopolitical interests. The fact that the Russian government and Gazprom have made 
numerous energy security justifications for the Nord Stream project reinforces this position. 
Economically as well, in 2010, it was predicted that although Nord Stream would not lead to 
a major increase of gas to Europe, it would make additional profits of between 500 million 
US and 30 billion US (Chyong, Noel & Reiner, 2010). This makes the project also very 
economically viable. Additionally, by shifting the gas flow away from Ukraine and Belarus as 
well as the Baltic Stes and Poland, the Kremlin is losing it foreign policy leverage in the post-
Soviet territories (Aalto, 2012).   
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Policy development case study four – Northern Europe  
 
The forth group is made up from Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. While these countries tend to be pragmatic and oriented towards business 
interests, they do constantly raise concerns about the state of Russian democracy and 
human rights abuses. They are also willing to challenge Russia when the Kremlin violates 
diplomatic norms and their commercial interests. Among these countries the UK is in a 
speĐial positioŶ. UŶtil just a deĐade ago, LoŶdoŶ ǁas seeŶ as MosĐoǁ͛s stƌategiĐ partner. 
The former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the first of the EU leaders to attempt to 
build a strong relationship with Vladimir Putin before he had been even elected President 
aŶd despite the gloďal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs oǀeƌ huŵaŶ ƌights ǀiolations in Chechnya (The 
GuaƌdiaŶ, ϮϬϬϬͿ.  Neǀeƌtheless, PutiŶ͛s stƌategiĐ ƌesouƌĐe ŶatioŶalisatioŶ politiĐs 
contributed to the deterioration of gas relationships, and culminated in an ever more 
reserved relationship after the disputes over British Petroleuŵ aŶd “hell͛s stakes iŶ the 
Sakhalin II and Kovykta gas fields (The Times, 2007). Rising tensions between Russia and 
Europe over the Ukrainian crisis, had an impact on Russian business in the UK. The British 
giant BP that has been designing to extract gas from the Russian Arctic, and Shell that has 
been contributing on development of gas projects in Siberia, have been reported to lose 
GBPϭϬϬ ďillioŶ aŶd aƌe paǇiŶg high pƌiĐe foƌ WestŵiŶsteƌ͛s positioŶ oŶ ‘ussia ;The Tiŵes, 
2014).   
The Noƌd stƌeaŵ pipeliŶe͛s eǆteŶsioŶ to supplǇ gas to the UK aŶd the NetheƌlaŶds ǁas 
scrapped in 2014 amid worsening relations between the regional powers and Russian 
government over the Ukrainian conflict. The preliminary negotiations of the project were 
held in 2012, and part of the financial Gazprom rationale was to target the UK market. John 
Lough sates that giǀeŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt politiĐal Đliŵate aŶd the teŶsioŶs iŶ ‘ussia͛s ƌelatioŶships 
with the western countries, there will not be a possibility that this project will be 
implemented (Chatham House, 2014). BP is also the leading company in promoting the 
Nabucco pipeline and gas transport directly from Azerbaijan. In 2013 BP secured the deal to 
build the Nabucco West to supply central Europe and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to export 
Azeri gas to Italy (Rzayeva, 2013).  
65 
 
The Russian relationship with the northern European countries has a completely different 
dimension compared to the rest of Europe. Denmark and Sweden are almost independent 
from Russian gas supply as neighbouring  Norway has its own reserves of natural gas in the 
North Sea basin and is a the biggest supplier to the region. The lack of gas dependency 
therefore makes the region very hard to penetrate for Russian gas diplomacy. The only 
recent instance of political pressure exhibited by the both sides was the implementation of 
the Nord Stream pipeline project, which now also runs through the Swedish offshore. Russia 
however declared the pipeline to be a strategic asset of the official foreign policy and hence 
is ready to use military resources to defend the pipeline.  
Concurrently, their proximity to the Arctic is widely presented as the object of the 
geopolitical race and Russia is considered the main driver (Overland, 2010). The Artic holds 
an estiŵated ϯϬ peƌ ĐeŶt of uŶdisĐoǀeƌed ǁoƌld͛s ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal Ŷatuƌal gas ƌesouƌĐes 
according to the assessment carried out by the US Geological Survey (USGS) (Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). Furthermore, most the Artic gas is expected to be 
located in the Russian territorial waters. Consideration of these resources as commercially 
viable is what makes the regional policy about gas extraction. It is not therefore surprising 
that that a substantial part of Arctic resources may be found in Russian areas, since the 
largest geographical part of Arctic waters belongs to the country. Whatever the outcomes of 
the gloďal eǆistiŶg teƌƌitoƌial disputes oǀeƌ the AƌĐtiĐ ǁateƌs, ‘ussia as the ǁoƌld͛s laƌgest 
country in the Northern hemisphere and the country with the longest Arctic shoreline, is 
bound to be the main Arctic power in territorial terms.  
Due to the narrative of the gas relationships in the region, Russian prefers to employ hard 
power gas diplomacy to advance its regional policy objectives.  The example of this is the 
negotiations around the construction of Nord Stream. Although the pipeline is designed to 
deliver Russian gas to primarily Western European clients, geographically, it passes through 
“ǁedish teƌƌitoƌial ǁateƌs. The ͚“ǁedish aŶd DaŶish dileŵŵa͛ ;KupĐhiŶskǇ, ϮϬϬϲͿ oŶ Noƌd 
Stream encompasses various issues that are potentially damaging to Swedish and Danish 
sovereignty and governance. Nord Stream has potentially military implications as it may 
become a target of terrorist attacks. This would mean an increased Russian military 
presence in the Baltic Sea region that is a source of political friction. In 2006 Putin 
announced that the Nord Stream pipeline construction is a major priority because it ensures 
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that Russian energy resources go directly to the west European consumers. Therefore, 
Russia planned to use the opportunities offered by the navy to resolve environmental, 
economic and technical problems. All this incorporated a few new but yet absolutely crucial 
diƌeĐtioŶs foƌ the ŶaǀǇ͛s aĐtiǀities in the Baltic Sea.  
While naval activities in economic zones of the littoral states on the Baltic Sea is permitted 
according to international laws (Geng, 2012), Nord Stream gives Russia a reason for 
increased presence should it ever feel a need for it. Froŵ the KƌeŵliŶ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, 
however, patrolling the pipeline stretch should be welcomed as it is a necessary step 
towards an uninterrupted gas supply to the EU, but increased militarisation of the sea can 
thus bring political tensions. The patrol of the pipeline and the riser platform also bring 
increased intelligence capabilities. Given the close connection between energy companies 
and the Russian government, Gazprom and the Kremlin in particular, there are reasons for 
Swedish officials to be sceptical. Carl B. Hamilton, a Swedish MP that followed the topic 
closely, states that there have been mixed signals from Russian ambassador Alexander 
Kadalkin and Dirk Von Ameln, a spokesman from Nord Stream. According to Kadalkin the 
pipeline can be operated and serviced without the raiser platform, while Von Ameln claimed 
that theƌe had to ďe oŶe ;LaƌssoŶ, ϮϬϬϳͿ. Caƌl HaŵiltoŶ͛s Liďeƌal paƌtǇ pƌess ƌelease theŶ 
stated that PutiŶ͛s ƌhetoƌiĐ aŶd the aĐtioŶs of Noƌd “tƌeaŵ AG ǁeƌe hostile aŶd ĐoŶĐluded: 
͞“ǁedish ŵilitary and Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) do not accept that the 
ƋuestioŶ is puƌelǇ aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal issue […] “ǁedeŶ ĐaŶ, ǁith ĐuƌƌeŶt ƌegulatioŶs, stop 
the construction of service platform. Nord Stream, However, does not answer the central 
question, whether the management of technical issues must be done in the Swedish 
economic zone. Nord Stream and Russian Embassy in Stockholm are giving conflicting 
stateŵeŶts oŶ this ŵatteƌ.͟ ;Caƌl HaŵiltoŶ in Larsson, 2007, pp.4-5).  
The naval activity would get Russia a competitive intelligence edge concerning all 
subsurface, surface and aerial monitoring of the Baltic Sea. The pipeline, for example, is laid 
in close proximity to the Finnish military exercise fields.  
Although the risk of a terrorist attack is small and historically the frequency of such incidents 
is low, it does happen occasionally as demonstrated by terrorist attack in Nigeria in June 
2006. Russian demands to defend the pipeline from terrorism, therefore, are likely to fall 
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under Swedish territorial jurisdiction. However, Russia has a strong ambition to protect its 
citizens and on numerous occasions indicated having a doctrine of preventive and pre-
emptive strikes anywhere in the world where Russian interests or citizens are threatened by 
terrorism. There is legislation that allows the Russian President to send out Special Forces 
units abroad without seeking permission from or giving details to the Duma. Hypothetically, 
these forces could not be military but from Security Service the FSB, however, considering 
the conduct of previous operations in the Dubrovka theatre, Moscow in 2002 and in Beslan 
School, North Ossetia in 2004, there are reasons to be sceptical about their non-military 
performance.  
The other point of friction between Russia, Sweden and Denmark was the environmental 
concerns over the position of Nord Stream. Sweden in fact, tried to argue that the risks are 
so grave that the pipeline must be rerouted. It succeeded, however, in 2008 to demand 
additional study of the potential negative impacts of the Nord Stream pipeline on the Baltic 
Sea (543/60 EU, 2008). The vocal debate had managed to create a public debate in several 
EU states, including Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, but was unsuccessful to halt the 
construction progress. After negotiating for four years with Danish and Swedish officials and 
spending 100 million EUR on environmental analysis along the entire route (Mityayev, 2009) 
Nord Stream AG finally obtained construction permits. During those years the pipeline was 
rerouted several times on environmental grounds.  
“iŵultaŶeouslǇ, ‘ussia͛s aƌĐtiĐ stƌategǇ eŵphasises iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoopeƌatioŶ aŶd settiŶg up 
of a regional system of search and rescue. Increased activity of Russian governmental bodies 
and nongovernmental organisations in international forums mutually benefits Russia 
presence in the Arctic improving the quality of life of indigenous peoples, modernisation of 
infrastructure and developing environmentally safe tourism. The document uses modern 
terminology and introduces environmental security as one of its key points (Overland, 
2010). Many of these terms align with the soft power values such as cooperation and are 
given high priority.  
The question of Russian expansion northwards is also a technological and organisational 
one. According to an estimate, Russia would need to build infrastructure to extract and 
transport 160 billion cubic metres of gas from its continental shelf by 2030 (Savelyeva & 
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Shiyan, 2010). While it needs more technology and capital, it is a reason to involve more 
foreign investments and companies.  However, resource nationalism and the Soviet dogmas 
are the main obstacles of such developments pushing Russia to employ more aggressive 
hard power diplomacy. The issue is then also complicated by the fact that Russia is not only 
an energy superpower but it is also a post-Communist still undergoing transition. One of the 
main aspects of moving away from communist dogmas is openness to the foreign 
investment in strategic energy sector.  
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Conclusion  
The examination of the interactions between energy and international politics has clearly 
demonstrated that the two are integrally interlinked. Commercial and political 
considerations considerably influence each other and can rarely be neatly separated. An 
integrated EU gas market has increased the degree of interdependence in the world 
economic and political system. No country can individually protect itself from the impact of 
market fluctuations. This research has focused on the nature of natural gas diplomacy. This 
is a reflection of two major developments: natural gas represents the fastest growing fuel in 
terms of European and global consumption and the nature of the natural gas transport ties 
it considerably more to politics between the states than most other fuel sources, including 
oil supply. 
In extended discussion of the politics of gas supply the researcher contends that the 
establishment of a major supply between countries is an expression of the relations 
between the countries rather than the tool to build them. In the case where the pipelines 
have preceded the establishment of political cooperation such as the aftermath of the 
Soviet breakup, transit has often served as a source of friction and contention between the 
states. However, the value of these relationships as a model for evaluating the nature of 
various gas supply relationships should not be exaggerated, since the infrastructure 
inherited after the Soviet Union collapsed functions quite differently from the willingly 
established gas diplomatic ties between two or more countries. Due to the relative 
symmetry of dependence between Moscow and European states, the potential supply 
vulnerability of Western European states in much lower than that of the former Soviet 
republics and satellites, and Russia͛s dealiŶgs ǁith its foƌŵeƌ “oǀiet Ŷeighďouƌs aƌe Ŷot 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ a ŵodel foƌ the patteƌŶ of ‘ussia͛s futuƌe gas supplies to the ƌest of the EU.  
At the saŵe tiŵe, studǇiŶg ‘ussia͛s foƌŵeƌ “oǀiet Ŷeighďouƌs is iŶdiĐatiǀe as to the ƌole of 
transit states in supply relations. While consumers and suppliers are rarely upset by the 
stability of the natural gas supply, transit countries hold the lever of influence. Accordingly, 
gas supply diplomacy that involves the element of transit requires a much higher degree of 
management and is inherently less stable than direct natural gas supply relations. Yet, 
Russian practices of gas diplomacy emerge in a context of superpower illusion. Much of the 
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Russian influence in EE and the Baltics region is inherent, the result of Tsarist and Soviet 
legacies as much as the current policies. Russian culture to a different extent has been a 
paƌt of the soĐial ŵatƌiǆ iŶ the ƌegioŶ. Likeǁise, the ƌegioŶ͛s eŶeƌgǇ depeŶdeŶĐǇ is a pƌoduĐt 
of what had been a tight interdependency during the Soviet period and unsurprisingly 
Russia is retaining an interest in the energy policies of the successor states. This interest is 
amplified after 1991 when the region became a transit corridor for its gas exports to the EU.  
The context is also shaped by the many self-induced weaknesses that constrain the Baltic 
States and EE states. The persistence of energy dependency is a reflection of the failure of 
the elites to address the vulnerabilities that they have inherited. Russia itself, however, is 
not creator of these weaknesses but it seeks to preserve them and obstruct those who seek 
to overcome them. This fact makes Russian gas diplomacy in the region very different from 
the ƌest of the EU. MosĐoǁ͛s appƌoaĐh also diffeƌs fƌoŵ ǁhat is ƌegaƌded as tƌaditional soft 
power. It serves to divide rather than unite and to arouse apprehension rather than provide 
comfort. As case study one has illustrated, Russian soft power is accompanied by harder 
elements and vice versa.   
Russian gas diplomacy in the Southern and central Europe similar to the EE and the Baltic 
States are heavily dependent on the Soviet gas infrastructure. Due to this dependency the 
oǀeƌall politiĐal Đliŵate iŶ the ƌegioŶ is ŵoƌe toleƌaŶt of the KƌeŵliŶ͛s eŶeƌgǇ poliĐies. This is 
also supported by the opportunities that are presented by Russian economic growth. More 
economically prominent central European countries and their economies seek to benefit 
from becoming Russian gas hubs for the Western European partners. Furthermore, the 
Southern European partners led by Greece and Cyprus, have extremely friendly 
relationships with the Kremlin. On the background of austerity forced upon them by 
Germany and the IMF, Russia has succeeded to portray itself as the saviour and the 
champion of economic and political equality. This results in the phenomenon also known as 
the ͚TƌojaŶ Hoƌse͛ ǁheƌe “outheƌŶ EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies aƌe ǁilliŶg aŶd iŶǀested to pƌoŵote 
Russian gas and overall political interests and foreign policy objectives within the EU 
legislative bodies.  
‘ussia͛s appƌoaĐh to the AƌĐtiĐ aŶd its gas diploŵaĐǇ iŶ the NoƌtheƌŶ EuƌopeaŶ ƌegioŶ is 
dramatically different from that of other EU regions. The Northern European states are 
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quasi-independent from Russian gas supplies. At the same time, these countries also 
present themselves as equals in the negotiation of global Arctic policy. The comfortable 
position of the Kremlin is rooted in the fact that most of the energy resources are located in 
the basin of Russian territorial waters. A further question is what form of international and 
regional cooperation Moscow will seek in extracting their energy resources, especially 
participation of the international companies. The Russian government has been swaying on 
this question. Important factors that contribute to the final decision include the demand of 
natural gas in the EU, the rising and subsidising tides of resource nationalism and the 
attitudes towards private international companies and foreign investment.  
The case of Western Europe becomes apparent that the main characteristic of the regional 
gas diplomacy is the acute interdependence. This approach is based on the understanding of 
ŵutual ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ďeŶefit aŶd ďalaŶĐe of politiĐal poǁeƌs. ‘ussia͛s positioŶ oŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg 
the image of a reliable gas supplier to its major Western clients is the main driver of its soft 
gas diplomacy.  
The analysis of the case studies therefore shows that Russian gas diplomacy varies in its 
nature according to the EU region it is engaging with. However, if the regions are seen as 
one whole entity, Russian gas diplomacy employs smart power tools to achieve the 
KƌeŵliŶ͛s foƌeigŶ eŶeƌgǇ oďjeĐtiǀes. “iŵultaŶeouslǇ, the tools aǀailaďle to ‘ussia to shape 
the ǁaǇ it puƌsues its iŶteƌŶatioŶal goals aƌe liŵited. UltiŵatelǇ, ‘ussia͛s power is also 
constrained by those tools. This predicament became most apparent in 2010 when Gazprom 
returned to the price renegotiations with Ukraine. The subsequent practice of gas price 
subsidies provided to Kiev was a manifestation of the pressures the Kremlin and Gazprom 
experience from their Western partners who feared gas supply disruptions. In providing 
subsidies to Ukraine, Russia was forced to engage in the variety of further negotiations 
involving energy costs and flows. Therefore, the Kremlin returned to the pre-2006 pricing 
patterns, in order to maintain the status of the reliable supplier in the EU, it has to sacrifice 
commercial interests in Ukraine.  
The results of this study are also essential for any future energy policy based research as 
theǇ ĐaŶ ďetteƌ aŶtiĐipate ‘ussia͛s fuƌtheƌ ŵoǀes ďǇ haǀiŶg a Đleaƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ǁhat 
types of gas diplomacy Russia employs and the limits that these tools impose on Russian 
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foreign policy objectives. The examples provided in the case studies have shown that Russia 
is more concerned with the security of gas demand, by controlling its gas resources and its 
export markets. This assessment is little helped by the as yet unknown outcomes of the civil 
war in Ukraine and the EU sanctions imposed over Russian exports and the 
countersanctions that the Kremlin is willing to introduce.  In light of this, gas diplomacy with 
an ingrained smart power orientation in the Russian-EU bilateral energy relations is critical 
but can at times appear limited due to the nature of the current dialogue. Yet, the gas 
diplomacy between Russia and European capitals has the ability react swiftly and in case of 
the disputes with Brussels officials. Thus, if momentum is not injected in the Russo-
European energy dialogue, it is rational to expect a continuation of the reaction on reaction 
scenario in the bilateral negotiations with the reduced change for utility maximisation.  
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